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POPULATION-BASED SENTENCING
Jessica M. Eaglin†
The institutionalization of actuarial risk assessments at
sentencing reflects the extension of the academic and policydriven push to move judges away from sentencing individual
defendants and toward basing sentencing on population level
representations of crimes and offenses. How have courts responded to this trend? Drawing on the federal sentencing
guidelines jurisprudence and the emerging procedural jurisprudence around actuarial risk assessments at sentencing,
this Article identifies two techniques. First, the courts have
expanded individual procedural rights into sentencing where
they once did not apply. Second, the courts have created
procedural rules that preserve the space for judges to pass
moral judgment on individual defendants. These responses
exist in deep tension with policymakers’ goals to shape sentencing outcomes in the abstract. While courts seek to preserve the sentencing process, advocates encourage the courts
to manage the population-based sentencing tools. The courts’
response is potentially problematic, as refusal to regulate the
tools can undermine criminal administration. However, it
presents an underexplored opportunity for courts and opponents of the recent trend toward institutionalizing actuarial
risk assessments to jointly create the intellectual and policydriven space for more fundamental, structural reforms relating
to the U.S. criminal legal apparatus. This Article urges the
courts and legal scholars to consider these alternatives going
forward.

† Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. For
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Stoughton, participants at the Culp Colloquium at Duke Law School, Emory Law
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INTRODUCTION
Law and policymakers increasingly encourage or require
courts to consider actuarial risk assessment instruments
(“RAIs,” “risk assessments,” or “tools”) in the felony sentencing
process.1 These tools standardize the prediction of an individual’s future behavior based on statistical analyses of historical
data collected about past offenders’ behavior.2 This develop1
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-1-412(b) (requiring inclusion of a risk/
needs assessment in the presentence reports provided to judges at sentencing);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.500(1) (“Except in cases where the defendant shall be
sentenced to a term of total confinement for life without the possibility of release
. . . the court may order the department [of corrections] to complete a risk assessment report” that shall be provided to the court if available before sentencing); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2154.7 (2020) (adopting a statewide actuarial tool to predict
individual defendants’ recidivism risk at sentencing in Pennsylvania); 204 Pa. C.
S. § 305. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 6B.09 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final
Draft 2017) (encouraging states to institutionalize actuarial risk assessments at
sentencing).
2
`
ANEGELE
CHRISTIN, ALEX ROSENBLAT & DANAH BOYD, COURTS AND PREDICTIVE
ALGORITHMS 1 (2015), https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/
Courts_and_Predictive_Algorithms.pdf [https://perma.cc/79FA-9HAW].

R

R
R
R
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ment has caused great controversy as a matter of public policy
and scholarly debate.3
As the tools proliferate at sentencing, scholars try to situate the trend within traditional sentencing reform frameworks.
For example, the institutionalization of actuarial risk assessments may reflect the pendulum swing in penal theory toward
consequentialist, forward-looking reforms rather than the
backward-looking, retributive reforms that dominated in earlier decades.4 Similarly, it may reflect the expansion of actuarial methods in the sentencing process.5 Finally, this trend
may reflect the expansion of transparent, system-level tools
that enhance accountability in judicial decision making at
sentencing.6
3
The scope of the debate is wide, with a particular interest in the fairness of
the tool design. See, e.g., Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J.
2218, (2019) (providing an overview of the debates). In the particular context of
post-conviction sentencing, debates are taking a turn toward the courts as much
scholarship and public discourse has emerged in the wake of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in State v. Loomis, which considered and rejected
several due process challenges to the use of a proprietary RAI at sentencing. 881
N.W.2d 749, 769-70 (Wis. 2016). E.g., Michael Brenner et al., Constitutional
Dimensions of Predictive Algorithms in Criminal Justice, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
267, 278–83 (2020) (critiquing the Loomis decision); Sharad Goel, Ravi Shroff,
Jennifer Skeem & Christopher Slobogin, The Accuracy, Equity, and Jurisprudence of Criminal Risk Assessment 15 (Dec. 26, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3306723 [https://
perma.cc/3675-H6CL] (commending the Loomis court for addressing risk assessments at sentencing, but critiquing the court for its flawed reasoning); Danielle
Citron, (Un)fairness of Risk Scores in Criminal Sentencing, FORBES (July 13, 2016,
3:26 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2016/07/13/unfairness-of-risk-scores-in-criminal-sentencing/#309a91754ad2 [https://perma.cc/
278X-N72U] (commending the Loomis court for addressing risk assessments, but
critiquing its approach based on automation bias); see also DANIELLE L. KEHL,
PRISCILLA GUO & SAMUEL KESSLER, ALGORITHMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: ASSESSING THE USE OF RISK ASSESSMENTS AT SENTENCING 21 (2017), http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33746041 [https://perma.cc/9D7PHTLD] (same).
4
See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Principles of Risk Assessment: Sentencing
and Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 583, 586, 592 (2018) (framing opposition to
actuarial risk assessments as a matter of opposing the consideration of risk at
sentencing, and emphasizing the theoretical and practical tensions between risk
and culpability).
5
To that end, a particular binary around RAIs has emerged—between accuracy and fairness in the metrics that shape an assessment—upon which scholars
and policymakers divide, and cannot agree. For exemplary scholarship on RAIs
and equal protection doctrine, see Mayson, supra note 3, at 2262–81 (2019)
(critiquing different interpretations of fairness metrics in RAI design); Aziz Z. Huq,
Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1056–57,
1101–02 (2019) (critiquing the limits of equal protection doctrine in ensuring
“racially just” algorithms in criminal administration).
6
Brandon L. Garrett & John Monahan, Judging Risk, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 439,
445 (2020) (“to change [judicial] behavior, it is not enough to adopt a technical
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Each of these frames offers important insight to this moment. Yet, together or alone, each is insufficient to conceptualize the broader transformation in the nature of sentencing
within which these tools make sense. While that transformation relates to the shifting orientation of punishment theory, it
also pertains to the kind of knowledge we expect judges to
prioritize at sentencing.7 Similarly, a focus on technological
advances in the tools’ design take for granted the social
changes that accompany it,8 including to the way we expect
judges to think at sentencing. Finally, thinking about actuarial
risk assessments through a focus on transparency, accountability, and bureaucratic structure can obscure how efforts to
make judicial sentencing transparent through creation of technical infrastructure have also, in turn, transformed the act of
sentencing for judges. As a result, actuarial risk assessments
are proliferating into sentencing processes, yet we lack a way to
fully conceptualize the significance of this development in historical and sociological context.9 This absence, in turn, limits
the scope of critique and constrains our imagination of potential pathways forward in light of this development in this historical moment. Accordingly, this Article seeks to expand the
frame.

tool—attitudes towards the use of risk assessment in decision-making need to be
addressed if the tool is to be used well.”); Kevin R. Reitz, “Risk Discretion” at
Sentencing, 30 FED. SENT’G REP. 68, 70–71 (2017) (noting that “[r]isk-based prison
policy is as American as apple pie” and urging its “domestication” because “it is
appalling that it has been administered with so little transparency or
accountability”).
7
KATJA FRANKO AAS, SENTENCING IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION: FROM FAUST TO
MACINTOSH 67 (2005) (“The struggles over the exercise of sentencing discretion are
. . . struggles about the format and nature of knowledge”); Malcolm M. Feeley &
Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections
and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 454 (1992) (noting that “the emphasis
on the systemic and on formal rationality” definitive of the new penology occurred
independent of the “pendulum swings of penal attitudes”).
8
Jessica M. Eaglin, Technologically Distorted Conceptions of Punishment, 97
WASH. U. L. REV. 589 (2019) (warning that the advance of technical reforms at
sentencing distort social conceptions related to punishment and mass incarceration) [hereinafter Eaglin, Technologically Distorted]; see generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE
188–92 (2007) (warning that the advance of the actuarial distorts social conceptions of punishment).
9
See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 167 (2001) (“[W]hen considering the [crime control] field as
a whole, we need to bear in mind that these new practices and mentalities co-exist
with the residues and continuations of older arrangements. . . . History is not the
replacement of the old by the new, but the more or less extensive modification of
one by the other.”).
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This Article asserts that the institutionalization of actuarial
risk assessments at sentencing reflects the extension of a
larger, historically situated push to move judges away from
passing moral judgment on individual defendants and toward
basing sentencing on population-level representations of
crimes and offenses. This trend exists in deep tension with the
aims and design of the traditional sentencing process. Courts
address that tension through procedural sentencing jurisprudence. This Article draws on the federal sentencing guidelines
jurisprudence and the emerging jurisprudence around actuarial risk assessments at sentencing to illuminate the ongoing
tension between courts and RAI advocates in this moment.
Further, by situating the jurisprudence in the frame of population-based sentencing, it identifies obscured possibilities in the
jurisprudence worthy of further exploration in the literature
going forward.
The institutionalization of actuarial risk assessments at
sentencing encourages judges to engage in population-based
sentencing. It substantiates a larger academic and policydriven push for judges to sentence based on surface, population-level representations of crimes and offenders rather than
to pass moral judgment based on an understanding of individual defendants at sentencing. This development fits within a
larger, historical shift that creates tensions with the traditional
sentencing process. While that process is designed for judges
to pass moral judgment on individual defendants, much about
the nature of sentencing changed in the late twentieth century.
Sentencing reforms like sentencing guidelines encouraged
judges to base sentences not on the peculiar characteristics of
the offender and the offense, but population level representations of the crime.10 Actuarial risk assessments do the same,
by further abstracting the offender through population-level
representations.11 By describing RAIs as part of the trend toward population-based sentencing, this Article provides a way
to conceptualize important continuities between this development and the history of sentencing that may otherwise be
concealed.
The Article uses the population-based sentencing frame to
offer new insight to the emerging jurisprudence around the use
of actuarial risk assessments in state courts. Drawing on the
jurisprudence that developed around the federal sentencing
guidelines for insight, this Article identifies two techniques that
10
11

See infra subpart I.A.
See infra subpart I.B.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-2\CRN202.txt

358

unknown

Seq: 6

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

16-FEB-21

10:52

[Vol. 106:353

the courts employ when responding to the trend toward population-based sentencing. First, the courts have expanded individual defendants’ procedural rights when a population-based
sentencing tool is implemented in a way that directly reduces a
judge’s ability to pass moral judgment on individual defendants at sentencing.12 To the extent that defendants and scholars ask courts to recognize new individual rights at sentencing
now in the face of actuarial risk assessments’ expansion, state
courts likely have not done so because the tools have not been
implemented in a way that reduces the potential for judges to
pass moral judgment at sentencing.13 Second, the courts have
responded to the trend toward population-based sentencing by
creating procedural rules that create the space for judges to
continue to pass moral judgment on individual defendants at
sentencing.14 Some state courts have created new procedural
rules to preserve this space through the jurisprudence on actuarial risk assessments at sentencing; others would carve out
that space without a new rule.15
There is a tension between the techniques courts adopt
and the trend toward population-based sentencing. While
courts try to preserve the traditional sentencing process and
maintain the space for judges to pass moral judgment on individual defendants, scholars and advocates encourage courts to
start managing the population-based tools through the sentencing process.16 The courts are not doing this. We can understand this trend in the jurisprudence as perilous, and for
good reason. Population-based tools influence judges; the
tools often lack important oversight in their design; and their
orientation around prevention threatens to frustrate traditional
criminal justice values.17 This Article suggests that the trend
in the jurisprudence presents obscured promise, too. Maintaining the sentencing process and preserving the space for
judges to keep passing judgment on individual defendants in
social context is itself a critique of the political and cultural
assumptions that sustain the trend toward population-based
sentencing.18 This critique can align with the deeper, structural critiques that many opponents to RAIs raise in the era of
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra
infra
infra
infra

subpart
subpart
subpart
subpart
Part IV.
subpart
subpart

II.A.
II.B.
III.A.
III.B.
IV.A.
IV.B.
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mass incarceration. This Article invites scholars to think more
critically about these possibilities going forward.
This contribution provides new insight to both the literature on RAIs and the literature on mass incarceration. While
there is much interest in how the courts’ respond to RAIs at
sentencing, scholarship tends to orient around the tools’ design.19 Analyzing the jurisprudence through a historically- and
sociologically-rich lens focused on sentencing invites scholars
to think more broadly about the significance of the emerging
jurisprudence in this historical moment. While RAIs’ opponents launch policy-driven and equal-protection based critiques of the tools as a response to mass incarceration, they can
overlook the possibilities in the procedural jurisprudence
around population-level sentencing.20 This Article invites RAI
critics to see the emerging state sentencing jurisprudence as a
foundation to critique this historical present. By framing this
development as part of the trend toward population-based sentencing, it foregrounds the qualitatively different kind of sentencing process grounded in human judgment of individual
offenders that judges try to preserve, but lack the vocabulary to
articulate. Further, it encourages courts and scholars to see
the trend toward population-based sentencing as a political
and cultural act that only makes sense in a particular social
context defined not by mass incarceration, but structural insecurity.21 The Article urges critical reflection on this social reality going forward, and illuminates the way that the
jurisprudence creates space for such reflection.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the
historical foundation of the sentencing process, and situates
actuarial risk assessments within the larger trend toward pop19
See, e.g., Brenner et al., supra note 3, at 279 (“The question is whether this
‘black box’ methodology [in actuarial risk assessments] violates the due process
rights of criminal defendants by denying them the opportunity to challenge their
output risk scores, or the means by which those scores were calculated.”).
20
See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 806, and 816 n.50 (2014)
(arguing that relying on actuarial risk assessments at sentencing “amounts to
overt discrimination” and violates the Equal Protection Clause and dismissing the
potential of the Sixth Amendment to address the equality-based concerns with the
design of actuarial risk assessments used at sentencing). For a recent exception
to this assertion, see Aziz Z. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, 106 VA. L. REV.
611 (2020) [hereinafter Huq, Human Decision]. While his exploration of the Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence centers on its implications for the individual’s right to
a human reviewer of increasingly complex, automated government decisions, see
id. at 617, this Article is concerned with how the courts use individual rights to
resituate and assert the judge’s role as decision maker at sentencing.
21
GARLAND, supra note 9, at 168.

R

R
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ulation-based sentencing. Part II demonstrates that courts expand individual defendants’ procedural rights at sentencing in
response to this trend. Part III demonstrates that courts create
procedural rules to preserve the space for judges to pass moral
judgment on individual defendants in the face of this trend.
Part IV identifies the tension between how courts are responding to actuarial risk assessments at sentencing, and how advocates of the trend want courts to respond to the tools. It
identifies perils in this tension. It also identifies a yet underexplored interest convergence between courts and RAIs’ opponents illuminated by the jurisprudence and worthy of further
exploration going forward.
I
THE HISTORICAL PRESENT
A.

Procedure Light Sentencing and the Move toward
Population-Based Sentencing

For most of the twentieth century, states and the federal
government maintained discretionary sentencing structures.22
In a typical discretionary structure, a judge would conduct a
sentencing hearing separate from the defendant’s trial of conviction.23 At the sentencing hearing, the judge would receive
information about the defendant’s personal background, their
criminal history, and details about the offense through a
presentence report before imposing an individualized sentence
tailored to the defendant.24 The judge was constrained by the
statutory sentencing range—meaning the sentence could not
fall above the statutory maximum or the statutory minimum
set by the legislature—but those ranges were typically quite
broad.25 A parole board would determine the actual amount of
time a defendant served.26
Under this structure, the entire sentencing process was
“predicated on the fundamental understanding” that a judge
would pass moral judgment upon each individual defendant.27
22
Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J.
377, 382, 392–93 (2005).
23
Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Procedural Rights at Sentencing, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 187, 190 (2014). For a brief history of presentence
reports in both state and federal courts, see John P. Higgins, Confidentiality of
Presentence Reports, 28 ALB. L. REV. 12, 12–13 (1964).
24
See id.
25
Id.
26
Chanenson, supra note 22, at 384–85.
27
KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 78-82 (1998) (describing the sentencing process in the federal

R
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Accordingly, judges retained broad sentencing discretion and
defendants, in turn, enjoyed minimal procedural protections.28
Williams v. New York is the emblematic decision on this
point.29 There, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a due process
challenge to a sentence based on concerns that the judge considered out-of-court statements contrary to the defendant’s
right to confront his accusers.30 The decision was grounded in
the rehabilitative ideal.31 It emphasized that procedural protections were counterproductive to the individualizing, discretionary act of sentencing.32
At the end of the twentieth century, law and policymakers
radically transformed sentencing. The process itself remained
the same—sentencing hearings continued and defendants still
enjoyed minimal procedural rights—but the nature of sentencing changed. The rehabilitative ideal as a guiding theory of
punishment declined.33 The idea of judges passing moral judgment upon individual defendants became a thing to fear rather
than a thing to celebrate.34 Policymakers across the country
system before creation of sentencing guidelines as one “predicated on the fundamental understanding that only a person can pass moral judgment, and only a
person can be morally judged.”).
28
Hessick & Hessick, supra note 23, at 190–91.
29
337 U.S. 241 (1949).
30
Id. at 251.
31
Id. at 248–49 (“Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become
important goals of criminal jurisprudence. Modern changes in the treatment of
offenders make it more necessary now than a century ago for observance of the
distinctions in the evidential procedure in the trial and sentencing processes.”).
32
Id. at 249 (“Under the practice of individualizing punishments, investigational techniques have been given an important role.”).
33
Empirical research and scholarship also emerged in this time period that
critiqued rehabilitation. See, e.g., Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions
and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22 (1974). For a recent account of
the decline then transformation in notions of rehabilitation in criminal administration, see Eaglin, Technologically Distorted, supra note 8, at 517–23. Notably,
the intellectual foundation for the change in sentencing emerged through a turn
away from rehabilitation toward retribution-oriented policies. See ANDREW VON
HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 41-42 (1976) (advocating a turn
from rehabilitation to “just deserts”). The idea was that such a turn would reduce
criminal incarceration sentences. Id. at 43 (suggesting the turn would create a
foundation to “set reasonable limits to the extent of punishment”). In reality, it
did not. Incarceration in the United States soared starting in the 1970s until
2009. See E. ANN CARSON, PRISONERS IN 2013 1 fig. 1 (2014) (showing the increase
in state and federal prison populations between 1978 and 2009).
34
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 17 (“The reformers of our day fear that
discretion leads to unduly disparate sentences for similar crimes by similar offenders.”). The broad discretion allocated to judges in a discretionary sentencing
structure came under attack from the left and the right. From the left, critics
argued that sentencing outcomes were arbitrary, and from the right, critics argued that sentencing outcomes were too lenient. See NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST
CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA 108–11 (2014) (discussing the

R
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implemented sentencing reforms to constrain judicial sentencing discretion. For example, states and the federal government
expanded mandatory minimum penalties.35 These statutes required particular sentence outcomes, usually to a term in
prison, based on specific factors present in the commission of
an offense.36 Several states and the federal government also
created sentencing guidelines.37 Under the guidelines, criminal statutes remained the same, meaning broad ranges existed
for most offenses of conviction, but legislatures and commissions narrowed the range within which judges were expected to
sentence an individual based on predetermined administrative
diktats concerning the offense and the offender’s criminal
history.38
These reforms encouraged or required judges to sentence
based on population-level representations of criminal offenses.
These reforms tried to fix sentences well in advance of the
instant case. Sentencing guidelines, in particular, introduced
a “large degree of impersonality” to the sentencing process by
focusing the judge’s attention on the “nomenclature of crimes”
rather than the social context of their commission.39 Following
Professor David Garland, these sentencing reforms “rendered
[the offender] more and more abstract, more and more stereotypical, more and more a projected image rather than an individuated person.”40 In so doing, guidelines, like other
sentencing reforms of that moment, “extended the distance between the effective sentencer (in reality, the legislature or the
sentencing commission) and the person upon whom the sentence is imposed.”41 In effect, “the individualization of sentencing [gave] way to a kind of ‘punishment-at-a-distance’ ” wherein
judges were less likely to sentence based on “the peculiar facts
of the case and the individual characteristics of the offender.”42
shortcomings in “disparity” as a basis for sentencing reform in the federal
system).
35
Kevin R. Reitz, The Disassembly and Reassembly of U.S. Sentencing Practices, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 229 (Michael Tonry &
Richard S. Frase eds., 2001).
36
Id.
37
Id. at 222, 225–26 tbl. 6.1 (describing the commission and guidelines
approach to sentencing reform throughout the states).
38
See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 23, at 190.
39
AAS, supra note 7, at 20–21.
40
GARLAND, supra note 9, at 179.
41
Id.
42
Id.; see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A
Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 902 (1991) (identifying “the
movement from individualized to aggregated sentences” embodied by guideline
regimes in federal and state systems and arguing that this trend “has marked a

R
R
R
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These population-based sentencing reforms raised concern
that procedural protections, once scant at sentencing, had become necessary.43 Despite initial resistance in cases like McMillan v. Pennsylvania,44 the U.S. Supreme Court issued a
series of decisions in the 2000s that would bring more constitutional criminal procedure to bear on noncapital sentencing.45
The Court subsequently ruled that procedural protections depend on the kind of sentencing structure a jurisdiction
maintains.46
Thus, procedural rights in the noncapital felony sentencing
context remain minimal.47 Some procedural protections apply
to all convicted persons regardless of the sentencing structure.
For example, the right to counsel and the due process right to
be heard apply to persons convicted of felonies in all jurisdictions.48 In a “mandatory” sentencing structure, where sentence outcomes are “specif[ied] . . . based on particular facts,”
defendants have additional procedural protections.49 These include the right to a jury determining sentencing facts beyond a
reasonable doubt if that fact is necessary to impose a higher
sentence than could be imposed under either the statute or the
guidelines in the absence of that fact,50 and the right to notice
backward step in the search for just criminal punishments.”) [hereinafter Alschuler, Failure of Sentencing Guidelines]; Albert W. Alschuler, Monarch, Lackey,
or Judge, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 723, 734–35 (1993) (emphasizing his critique of
data-driven, state sentencing guidelines).
43
See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Procedural Issues Raised by Guidelines Sentencing: The Constitutional Significance of the “Elements of the Sentence”, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 147, 157 (1993) (“The absence of procedural protections may well
have been reasonable when sentencing was not a truly legal decision. In a discretionary sentencing scheme dominated by at least a rhetoric of rehabilitation, the
sentence was not a product of any findings of fact about the nature of the offense,
but rather a product of the judge’s intuition about the defendant’s prospects for
rehabilitation. . . . The current situation is quite different.”).
44
477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986).
45
See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 236–37 (2005) (recognizing that the introduction of sentencing guidelines created “new circumstances”
that led the Court to the answer new questions of procedure “developed in Apprendi and subsequent cases.”).
46
Hessick & Hessick, supra note 23, at 188.
47
Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1775–78
(2003) (arguing that the volume of procedural trial rights applicable at sentencing
further the goal of a “best estimate” in sentencing); Carissa Byrne Hessick & F.
Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
47 (2011) (building on Michaels’ “best estimate” framework).
48
See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (right to counsel); Glover v.
United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203–04 (2001) (right to effective assistance of
counsel).
49
Hessick & Hessick, supra note 23, at 188.
50
Booker, 543 U.S. at 230.
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of facts that a judge will consider to enhance the sentence.51
The ex post facto clause applies in such structures as well.52
The rules of evidence do not apply at sentencing, though courts
generally adhere to some minimal expectations of relevance
and reliability in the evidence considered.53
B.

Actuarial Risk Assessments as the Extension of
Population-Based Sentencing

Today, law and policymakers are embracing the institutionalization of actuarial risk assessment instruments into
state sentencing processes across the country. These tools
standardize the prediction of an individual’s future behavior
based on statistical analyses of historical data on past offenders’ behavior. RAI developers identify statistical correlations
between group traits and group criminal offending rates to select objective predictive risk factors.54 Common predictive factors that enhance a defendant’s risk score include criminal
history, age, gender, and socioeconomic factors like education,
family ties, and antisocial behavior.55 Actuarial instruments—
whether produced as a checklist or through a computer-generated survey—use the presence of select predictive risk factors
to assess the likelihood that a person will engage in criminal
behavior defined as “recidivism” in the future.56 Rather than
communicate the assessment as a statistical number, most
tools offer a qualitative assessment.57 Thus, tools tend to classify persons as low-, medium-, or high-risk of engaging in certain future behavior.58
51

Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 132 (1991).
Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 543–44 (2013).
53
E.g., FED. R. EVID. 1101(d) (evidentiary rules do not apply to sentencing
proceedings); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 6A1.3 cmt. (“In resolving any
dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court
may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the
rule of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient
indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.”). State courts maintain
similar expectations. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. Law § 400.15(7)(a) (McKinney)
(providing restrictions on sentencing evidence in New York).
54
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 17–18 (2007) (emphasizing that actuarial risk assessments
“rely on statistical correlations between a group trait and that group’s criminal
offending rate” to “determine criminal justice outcomes for particular individuals
within those groups”).
55
Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 240–41 (2015).
56
Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 68 &
n.41 (2017) [hereinafter Eaglin, Constructing].
57
Id. at 86.
58
Id. at 86–87.
52
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Like earlier efforts to formalize judicial decision making,
these tools encourage judges to engage in population-based
sentencing. Their expansion prioritizes “a certain mode of
thinking [at sentencing] which is based on working on the surface, rather than on in-depth understanding.”59 Actuarial risk
assessments do not convey information about the circumstances that bring a defendant into the courtroom nor what
that individual will do after sentencing, whether incarcerated
or not. Rather, it provides a static prediction of the likelihood
that populations similarly situated to the defendant would engage in future behavior at the moment the assessment is administered.60 Thus, like guidelines before them, this
population-based sentencing tool obscures the peculiar facts of
the case and the individual characteristics of the actual offender appearing before a judge. While earlier reforms encouraged judges to base sentencing decisions on populationlevel representations of crime, the institutionalization of actuarial risk assessments abstracts through population-level representations of the offender.
Thus, sentencing guidelines and actuarial risk assessments share important similarities, but also differ in significant
ways. Though both mandatory minimums and sentencing
guidelines contained an element of prediction in their design,
actuarial risk assessments enhance that feature.61 Like sentencing guidelines, RAIs are meant to constrain judicial discretion without changing sentence statutes. Unlike many
guidelines that were implemented to shape sentence outcomes
directly, to date, RAIs “reduce discretion, not in a direct way
but by ‘nudging’ judges, prosecutors, and other court staff to
59

AAS, supra note 7, at 5.
Numerous RAIs exist, and a variety of tools appear at sentencing. Some
tools predict future arrest and others predict future conviction. Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 56, at 71–72. While most tools predict future behavior, newer
tools may assess a person’s “risk-needs” as well. See Hamilton, supra note 55, at
238–39 (describing “fourth generation” risk-needs-responsivity assessments).
While these newer tools rely on “dynamic,” meaning mutable, risk factors, the
prediction itself is static. Slobogin, Principles, supra note 4, at 593 (urging the use
of risk assessments that use “dynamic, or ‘causal risk factors,’ such as drug
abuse or impulsivity” because “these are risk factors that can be changed through
intervention and thus focus on traits that the person can do something about.”).
61
Many states already use criminal history as a crude predictor of risk in
their state sentencing structures. See HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 88–100 (2007);
Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 56, at 67–68; Nancy J. King, Sentencing and Prior
Convictions: The Past, the Future, and the End of Prior-Conviction Exception to
Apprendi, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 523, 539–46 (2014). For a discussion of the ascendance in actuarial thinking more broadly in criminal administration, see generally
HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 39–107 (describing the historical rise of actuarial
methods in criminal law administration).
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follow the predictions of the algorithm.”62 While several sentencing guidelines aggregated historical data on past sentencing practices, RAIs rely on more historical data that does not
necessarily relate to sentencing,63 blameworthiness,64 or even
criminal administration.65 Further, the tools are increasingly
complex, meaning now or in the near future, no one, not even
the tool designer, may understand why a defendant is classified in a particular risk category.66 Finally, many of the popular RAIs used in the states are proprietary in nature.67
An expansive literature now considers actuarial risk assessments in criminal administration, with a particular focus
on its implications in the post-conviction sentencing context.
Yet, none engage with the tools in this way. Rather, scholarship orients around three different frames when discussing the
institutionalization of actuarial risk assessments at sentencing. First, many engage with the “risk” aspect of the tools.
62

See CHRISTIN et al., supra note 2, at 6–7.
Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 56, at 104. C.f. Anna Roberts, Arrests as
Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987, 989, 1007–08 (2019) (critiquing actuarial risk assessments that rely on arrests as predictive factors and a prediction outcome undermine the significance of the stage that is supposed to lie between arrest and
adjudication—including judicial dismissals in furtherance of justice); Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327, 332 (2017) (explaining the significance of judicial dismissals “in furtherance of justice”).
64
See John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal
Sentencing, 12 ANN. REV. CLIN. PSYCHOL. 489, 501–05 (2016) (explaining the tensions between actuarial risk tools’ design for sentencing and the civil context on
the basis of blameworthiness); John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV.
391, 427–28 (2006) (arguing that actuarial risk assessments used at sentencing
should include only predictive risk factors that pertain to blameworthiness).
65
For example, the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission considered including information like county of origin in its actuarial risk assessment at sentencing. See PA COMM’N ON SENT’G, SPECIAL REPORT: IMPACT OF REMOVING AGE, GENDER,
AND COUNTRY FROM THE RISK ASSESSMENT SCALE 1 (2015) (examining the impact of
removing age, gender, and county of origin from an actuarial risk assessment and
concluding that each demographic factor should be included to preserve predictive accuracy). The commission did not adopt this predictive factor in its tool due
to public backlash. See Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 56, at 113.
66
Current actuarial risk assessments use predetermined rules to predict
predefined outcomes, but there is some interest in the application of machine
learning tools to criminal administration, and sentencing specifically. See, e.g.,
Richard Berk & Jordan Hyatt, Machine Learning Forecasts of Risk to Inform Sentencing Decisions, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 222 (2015) (exploring the possibility to
improve accuracy in risk predictions).
67
See Constructing, supra note 56, at 69–71 (noting that some tools used at
sentencing are developed by sentencing commissions while others are created by
publicly funded organizations); see also Andrea Nishi, Note, Privatizing Sentencing: A Delegation Framework for Recidivism Risk Assessment, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
1671, 1688–90 (2019) (highlighting the various obscured, subjective decisions of
private developers and proposing alternative ways for courts to provide oversight
to their development).
63
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Thus, scholarship considers RAIs as part of a larger shift from
a backward-looking, retribution-oriented era of reform toward
a forward-looking, consequentialist-oriented era.68 Second,
many engage with the “actuarial” aspect of the tools. Thus,
much scholarship adopts an almost compulsive focus on “new”
issues relating to technical design or the nature of prediction in
criminal administration.69 Finally, many engage with actuarial
risk assessments as system-level tools to bring transparency
and accountability to the judicial decision making process.
Thus, scholarship considers how to implement and design actuarial risk assessments in criminal administration to best
control sentencing outcomes.70
While each of these frames is important, they are together
and alone insufficient to conceptualize the significance of actuarial risk assessments’ institutionalization in the felony sentencing process. Each offers insight to challenges that the
tools present in this current moment. Yet, by situating actuarial risk assessments in isolation, as a new solution in this
current moment or an old reform with a new twist, each frame
invites scholars to selectively draw upon different continuities
with the past that obscure a larger view of the present. For
example, thinking about the tools as a return to consequentialist reforms obscures the ways that this new kind of consequen68
See, e.g., Slobogin, Principles, supra note 4, at 592 (“if, as this article is
assuming, risk is a legitimate sentencing factor . . . the premise that punishment
is only about what people have done no longer applies. . . . Risk assessments are
orthogonal to culpability assessments, both conceptually (the first is forwardlooking, the second is backward-looking), and practically (for instance, a single
prior robbery conviction might call for more enhancement on desert grounds than
on risk grounds).”); see also Monahan & Skeem, supra note 64, at 508 (summarizing the issues relating to actuarial risk assessments at sentencing as a matter of
utilitarian versus blameworthiness concerns).
69
See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 3, at 268 (framing discussion around artificial intelligence and algorithmic tools); see also Huq, Human Decision, supra note
20, at 618 (framing the rise of actuarial risk assessments in the larger technological milieu of the moment). This literature in particular tends to explore the use of
technical risk assessments in criminal administration more broadly, rather than
limiting the scope to post-conviction sentencing. For exemplary scholarship
thinking about pretrial bail determinations and the design of actuarial risk assessments, see Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677,
687 (2018) (critiquing the definition of risk for actuarial tools used in the pretrial
bail context).
70
See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett & John Monahan, Judging Risk, 108 CALIF. L.
REV. 439, 476–83 (2020) (considering ways to convey risk information to improve
judicial use of the information and identifying several ways to shape sentence
outcomes through institutionalization of actuarial risk assessments in the pretrial
and post-conviction sentencing context); Reitz, supra note 6, at 70–71 (describing
the Virginia sentencing guidelines as a model of efforts to domesticate risk assessments and urging a “ratchet down approach” to their use at sentencing).
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tialism is completely different from the old form we abandoned
in the 1970s. That transformation pertains to the kinds of
sentences we expect judges to produce;71 it also pertains to the
kind of knowledge we expect judges to prioritize at sentencing.72 Similarly, a focus on technological change takes for
granted the social changes that accompany it,73 including to
the way we expect judges to think at sentencing. Finally,
thinking about actuarial risk assessments through a focus on
transparency, accountability, and bureaucratic structure can
erase the historically distinctive position of the judge at sentencing when situated within the larger sphere of criminal
administration.74
In short, the existing frameworks fail to fully capture social
and historical transformations in the nature of sentencing. Yet
seeing the bigger picture is critically important to understanding and critiquing the present. Thinking about the tools as part
of the trend toward population-based sentencing allows us to
engage with these continuities and discontinuities more fully.
It creates space to acknowledge that efforts to formalize sentencing change the nature of sentencing, and actuarial risk
assessments intensify that transformation. It also creates
space to recognize that while the sentencing process remains
the same, our expectations of judges are quite transformed.
Actuarial risk assessments intensify that transformation as
well.
The population-based sentencing frame is particularly important as the debates about actuarial risk assessments shift
toward the courts. Actuarial risk assessments raise a series of
concerns at sentencing that defendants are challenging in state
71
Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189, 194
(2013) (describing the shortcomings in embracing a new kind of rehabilitation
grounded in economic-style rationales like cost saving and effectiveness to reduce
mass incarceration); see also GARLAND, supra note 9, at 176 (describing the redefinition of rehabilitation).
72
AAS, supra note 7, at 67 (suggesting that, despite the claim that sentencing
reforms lack coherent theory, “[c]oherence lies in the fact that the ideas and
concepts which are, or can be, formatted tend to be given priority.”).
73
Jessica M. Eaglin, Technologically Distorted, supra note 8 (warning that the
advance of technical reforms at sentencing distort social conceptions related to
punishment and mass incarceration); see generally HARCOURT, supra note 54, at
188–92 (warning that the advance of the actuarial distorts conceptions of
punishment).
74
See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 81–82 (noting the unique role of
the judge in exercising “genuine judgment” at sentencing, which the federal sentencing guidelines threaten to undermine); AAS, supra note 7, at 35 (“Judges see
their job [at sentencing] as . . . creating a balance between the formal and substantive vision of justice—between the ‘tariff’ and the individual case.” (emphases in
original)).
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courts. Though the concerns are quite distinct from the issues
raised in relation to earlier era population-based sentencing
tools, we might expect that the courts’ response to the dilemmas they present may share important continuities that are
obscured by less holistic frames.75 Parts II and III take up that
task of illuminating those continuities.
II
TECHNIQUE #1: EXPANDING PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AT
SENTENCING
This Part argues that courts respond to the push toward
population-based sentencing by expanding individual procedural rights into the sentencing process where they once did not
apply. While the U.S. Supreme Court expanded some rights to
sentencing in response to the sentencing guidelines, state
courts have not done so in the context of actuarial risk assessments because the tools do not prevent judges from passing
moral judgment on individual defendants.
A.

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Jurisprudence

The U.S. Sentencing Commission developed the federal
sentencing guidelines at the behest of congressional mandates.
It produced a biaxial grid with 258 possible sentence ranges
within which a judge could exercise its discretion.76 That grid
provided a range within which a judge would ordinarily sentence. The court calculates that range based upon myriad administrative rules and policies concerning abstract features of
75
This Article focuses on what state courts are doing in response to actuarial
risk assessments, which concerns engaging with procedural concerns that the
tools raise at sentencing. Much scholarship considers equality-based concerns
with the design of actuarial risk assessments and its implications for equity. See
supra notes 5 & 20. This, too, should be analogized to the important case law and
scholarship that developed around equality, the courts, and earlier populationbased sentencing tools. For a seminal entry point to those topics, see David A.
Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1305 (1995)
(compiling circuit court opinions on issues of race and the 100:1 ratio under the
sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum penalties). Alas, that topic could
not be addressed in this Article, despite my many attempts to the contrary.
Thanks to my dutiful mentors for making me see this. Future work will consider
the topic, and I invite others to join me in that important endeavor.
76
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 5.A (setting forth the sentencing grid in
months of imprisonment). The commission designed the guidelines based on its
analysis of 10,500 presentence reports. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTAL
REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 21 (1987)
[hereinafter COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT]. For more on the design of sentencing
guidelines, see Eaglin, Technologically Distorted, supra note 8, at 512–13 (reflecting on the grid-like nature of most sentencing guidelines).
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the crime and the offender (particularly his criminal history).77
The tool was implemented in 1987.78 Though much revised
since that time, it remains in use.
This population-based sentencing tool transformed sentencing practice in fundamental ways. For example, the U.S.
Sentencing Commission created quantifiable metrics that
would convey crime severity at sentencing. These metrics, like
the choice to measure drug offenses by drug weight, were
deeply controversial and out of step with the courts’ past practice.79 Further, due to the guidelines’ complexity and the way
Congress implemented their use, a judge was recast as something more like “an accountant” who managed sentencing by
finding facts that applied to the guidelines.80 This was
achieved in three ways. First, the Commission’s complex
guideline structure appeared to preclude many reasons for a
judge to “depart,” meaning sentence a defendant to a period of
time that falls outside the mechanically calculated range proscribed by the guidelines.81 Second, the federal appellate
courts strictly enforced the Commission-proscribed sentencing
guideline ranges against district court judges as a matter of
choice.82 Third, Congress passed legislation that increasingly
aimed to reduce judges’ ability to depart from the prescribed
guideline ranges at sentencing.83 Through its implementation,
77

See generally U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (2018).
COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 11.
79
E.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2.D1.1 (1987). While the commission
used an empirical approach to replicate past practices with some offenses, they
did not in the context of drugs where they adopted a weight-based approach and
incorporated Congress’s mandatory minimum penalty ratios. Id.; see also Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 96 (2007) (“The Commission did not use
this empirical approach in developing the Guidelines sentences for drug-trafficking offenses.”).
80
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 82–85 (arguing that the tools eschewed
a more traditional notion of judging whereby judges pass “moral judgment” on
individual defendants for one where judges “process individuals according to a
variety of purportedly objective criteria.”).
81
Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1690-91 (1992)
(“The new [federal] sentencing guidelines are more complex, inflexible, and severe
than those devised by any other jurisdiction.”).
82
Id. at 1683–84 (describing the federal sentencing guidelines as “mandatory
guidelines” and emphasizing the “strict enforcement by courts of appeals hostile
to departures” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 703–04 (2010) (emphasizing that courts chose to
enforce the federal sentencing guidelines as though they were mandatory).
83
E.g., PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108–21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (amending
the federal sentencing guidelines to constrain the courts’ ability to depart from
guideline-recommended sentencing ranges). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2018) ren78
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the federal sentencing guidelines became “advice” only in
name. In practice, they left judges with very little room to sentence based on individual defendants. Under restrictive guidelines, judges engaged in something that looked a lot more like
processing, and a lot less like sentencing.84 In effect, judges
were increasingly required to engage in population-based
sentencing.
In response, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the procedural rights of individual defendants at sentencing. For example, in Burns v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
defendants are entitled to notice before a district court sua
sponte departs upward from an applicable sentence range
under the mandatory guidelines.85 Such notice was not required prior to the federal sentencing guidelines, and it did not
survive after the guidelines were rendered advisory.86 Yet, in
Burns, the majority opinion recognized that lack of such notice
in a sentencing process so changed by the federal sentencing
guidelines would raise serious, constitutional due process
concern.87
More notably, the court expanded application of the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right to jurisdictions with “mandatory”
sentencing structures in the 2000s.88 To understand the significance of this decision requires some legal background. In
discretionary sentencing structures, the jury trial right traditionally did not apply. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, however, the
dered the guidelines “mandatory.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2018) directed the appellate courts to review guideline departures under the searching de novo standard.
These provisions made “Guidelines sentencing even more mandatory than it had
been.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
84
Gertner, supra note 82, at 705.
85
Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 138-39 (1991) (“We hold that before
a district court can depart upward on a ground not identified as a ground for
upward departure either in the presentence report or in a prehearing submission
by the Government, [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 32 requires that the
district court give the parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a
ruling.”).
86
See id. at 133–34 (emphasizing procedural changes to the federal sentencing process created alongside the implementation of federal sentencing guidelines); Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713 (2008) (“At the time of our
decision in Burns, the Guidelines were mandatory; the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 prohibited district courts from disregarding “the mechanical dictates of the
Guidelines” except in narrowly defined circumstances. . . . Now faced with advisory Guidelines, neither the Government nor the defendant may place the same
degree of reliance on the type of ‘expectancy’ that gave rise to a special need for
notice in Burns.”).
87
Burns, 501 U.S. at 138; see also Irizarry, 553 U.S. at 713–14 (emphasizing
that Burns exists in the context of mandatory guidelines).
88
For a definition of mandatory, see supra note 85.
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U.S. Supreme Court applied the right to address concern about
sentences that exceeded the legislatively proscribed, statutory
range of sentence due to the court’s application of the state’s
technical guidelines.89 For example, when Charles Apprendi
was charged and pled guilty to weapons possession charges,
the statute permitted a sentence of up to ten years in prison.90
The trial judge found an additional fact—that Mr. Apprendi
intended to commit a hate crime—and enhanced the sentence
guideline range accordingly.91 The judge ultimately sentenced
Mr. Apprendi to twelve years in prison—two years above the
statutory maximum for the crime.92 The Apprendi Court
struck down the sentencing enhancement beyond the statutory
range of conviction as “a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.”93 The holding rejected, as unconstitutional,
the ability of the court to find facts that would produce a sentence that exceeded the statutory maximum for the charged
offense.
Four years later, the court expanded application of the jury
trial right to within-statute guideline ranges in Washington
State and the federal system. In Blakely v. Washington, the
U.S. Supreme Court applied the jury trial right to strike down
Washington State’s “presumptive” sentencing guideline system.94 Under that system, Washington law set a “standard”
range of punishment for most crimes.95 A judge could sentence above that range if an “aggravating factor” was present.96
The Washington statute provided an “illustrative rather than
exhaustive” list of “grounds for departure” from the guidelines.97 Though “judges were not limited to that list of factors
nor were they obligated to increase a sentence based on a finding of one of the aggravating factors,” the U.S. Supreme Court
deemed the structure as mandatory.98 As the Court explained,
a judge could not issue a sentence without finding some additional fact.99 Thus, it held that the sentencing range ensured
by jury-found facts is effectively the “statutory maximum” in
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469–70 (2000).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 495 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)).
542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004); see also id. at 317 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 303.
Id.
Id. at 305.
Hessick & Hessick, supra note 23, at 202; see also Blakely, 542 U.S. at

305.
99

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305.
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that mandatory sentencing structure. In Booker, a majority of
the Court held that the federal guidelines, like the Washington
State guidelines, violate due process and the Sixth Amendment.100 In both cases, the U.S. Supreme Court extended the
holding in Apprendi to mandatory guidelines operating within
statutory sentencing ranges.101
These cases suggest that, to the courts, procedural rights
and population-based sentencing are intimately linked. Where
policymakers adopt a sentencing structure that directly constrains judicial sentencing power to fashion a sentence by
passing moral judgment on the individual defendant, the
courts expand individual procedural rights. To that end, the
cases vindicate an important, but constructed, binary at sentencing: either judges retain sentencing discretion or defendants get more procedural rights in the face of population-based
sentencing.102 In some ways, this binary has existed since
Williams, when the court rejected a confrontation clause challenge to out-of-court statements included in a presentence report.103 Yet, the guidelines jurisprudence affirmed its salience
in the context of population-based sentencing tools.104 In the
100
Washington State’s guidelines operated in the same way as the federal
sentencing guidelines. The only meaningful distinction between the structures
concerned who developed the guidelines—a commission in the federal system,
and the legislature in Washington State. Like the Washington State courts, a
federal judge retained the power to depart from the sentencing guidelines. United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005).
101
Id. at 244; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301.
102
To the extent that judges play a more passive role in trials, one may think
of this principle as suggesting that the expansion of procedural rights is likely to
occur whenever sentencing takes on more characteristics of a trial. See STITH &
CABRANES, supra note 27, at 81 (distinguishing the reactive role of judges throughout the adjudication process and the active role of judges in the post-conviction
sentencing context). However, my aim is not to focus as much on the formalities
of the process for defendants, but the kind of thinking such a process permits
judges to engage in as the question that triggers expansion of individual procedural rights. See infra subpart II.B.
103
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
104
For insight to the curious persistence of Williams in the guidelines-based
era of sentencing reform, see Kyron Huigens, Solving the Williams Puzzle, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1051 (2005) (recognizing that it seems “paradoxical to impose constitutional limits on sentencing that is governed by rules, while permitting sentencing that is not governed by rules to escape all constitutional
constraint,” and defending the distinction on the basis that adjudication focuses
on rule of law while sentencing focuses on moral defensibility of our legal
judgments.
There are various liberty interests at the intersection of the due process and
jury trial right in the sentencing context implicated by offense-oriented population-based sentencing tools. This includes the pursuit of accurate fact finding,
Booker, 543 U.S. at 287–88 (Stevens J., dissenting in part) (arguing that in many
instances, engrafting the jury trial right would require the Government “simply
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wake of Booker, the Court has repeatedly affirmed this binary
in its sentencing jurisprudence.105 Where the judge can sentence individual defendants, more procedural protections are
not required. 106 The critical question turns on what kind of
sentencing structure a jurisdiction maintains.107
[to] prove additional facts to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”); see also In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970) (upholding the reasonable-doubt standard
as a due process right in part to reduce errors in factfinding); the allocation of
sentencing power between the branches of government, see Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004) (“[The jury trial right] is no mere procedural
formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure.
Just as suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”); see
also Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional
Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 63 (2003) (“The
Constitution . . . places a judicial veto in the hands of the people because the
danger of state abuse is especially high and the consequences are especially
troubling [in criminal administration]. . . . Less commonly observed is the fact
that the judiciary is comprised of both judges and juries and that this division
also checks state abuse of power.” (emphasis omitted)); and empowering local
juries to apply and contest applications of the law, see Alleyne v. United States,
570 U.S. 99, 123 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (“I cannot accept the
dissent’s characterization of the Sixth Amendment as simply seeking to prevent
‘judicial overreaching’ when sentencing facts are at issue. At the very least, the
Amendment seeks to protect defendants against ‘the wishes and opinions of the
government’ as well. And, that being so, it seems to me highly anomalous to read
Apprendi as insisting that juries find sentencing facts that permit a judge to
impose a higher sentence while not insisting that juries find sentencing facts that
require a judge to impose a higher sentence.” (citations omitted)); LAURA I. APPLEMAN, DEFENDING THE JURY: CRIME, COMMUNITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION 3–4 (2015)
(critiquing the elimination of “the local public” from the criminal justice process in
the last thirty years and celebrating the jury trial right jurisprudence as vindication of that important public function).
105
After Booker, the central concern is whether the guidelines operate enough
like law to require vindicating a procedural due process right at sentencing. For
example, in Irizarry v. United States, the Court held that the advisory sentencing
guidelines were not law-like enough for the due process right to notice. 553 U.S.
708, 713–15 (2008). In Peugh v. United States, the Court held that the guidelines
were law-like enough for ex post facto right. 569 U.S. 530, 534–35 (2013). In
Beckles v. United States, the Court held that the guidelines were not law-like
enough to implicate the void for vagueness doctrine. 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017).
106
This is, in itself, a quixotic question because sentencing structures exist on
a spectrum rather than a finite binary between “mandatory” and “advisory.” See
Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 155,
157 (2005) (setting forth a ten-point spectrum of enforceability); Hessick & Hessick, supra note 23, at 195 (arguing that mandatory and discretionary sentencing
structures are better understood as falling along a spectrum and urging application of procedural rights regardless of sentencing structure).
107
A line of the post-Booker jurisprudence considers whether, and what, additional procedural protections survive in an advisory guidelines system. The central concern is whether the guidelines operate enough like law to require
vindicating a procedural due process right at sentencing. The Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence is inconsistent in on that front. For example, in Irizarry v. United
States, the Court held that the advisory sentencing guidelines were not law-like
enough for the due process right to notice. 553 U.S. 708, 713–15 (2008). In
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Actuarial Risk Assessments in the State Sentencing
Jurisprudence

To date, state courts have not expanded individual procedural rights in jurisdictions where courts use particular actuarial risk assessments at sentencing. This is likely because the
tools have not been implemented in a way that fundamentally
undermines the court’s traditional ability to pass moral judgment on individual defendants at sentencing.
Defendants enjoy minimal procedural rights at sentencing,
yet actuarial risk assessments exist in some tension with those
rights. For example, actuarial risk assessments can undermine the defendant’s due process right not to be sentenced
based on irrational or irrelevant sentencing factors.108 Predictive risk factors exist in tension with state sentencing laws. As
an example, Indiana strictly regulates the consideration of acquitted behavior, yet actuarial tools may use such information
in assessing risk.109 Actuarial tools may also violate state laws
requiring that “sentence decisions be neutral of a variety of
status variables, including race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, and religion” and, in some instances, social status.110
While some argue that risk may influence the sentence, but
these individual sentencing factors cannot, there is some ambiguity on whether predictive risk factors and sentencing factors
should be considered as the same thing.111 Actuarial risk asPeugh v. United States, the Court held that the guidelines were law-like enough for
ex post facto right. 569 U.S. 530, 534–35 (2013). In Beckles v. United States, the
Court held that the guidelines were not law-like enough to implicate the void for
vagueness doctrine. 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017).
108
See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 778 (2017); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862, 885 (1983). Notably, the RAIs used in noncapital sentencing do not include
race as a predictive risk factor.
109
Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 56, at 104.
110
Hamilton, supra note 55, at 274 n.320 (citing statutes from Arkansas,
Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, and Tennessee prohibiting consideration of race, gender, and economic status at sentencing). For example, Ohio
and Tennessee prohibit gender as an influencing factor at sentencing. See OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.11(c) (West 2020) (“A court that imposes a sentence upon
an offender for a felony shall not base the sentence upon the race, ethnic background, gender, or religion of the offender.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-102(4)
(2020) (“Sentencing should exclude all considerations respecting race, gender,
creed, religion, national origin and social status of the individual. . . .”). For an
analogous argument in relation to federal statute should an actuarial risk assessment be adopted in the federal sentencing process, see Dawinder S. Sidhu,
Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 693–701 (2015) (raising the statutory
limitation issue, but providing “another, independently-sufficient basis for
prohibiting” these factors in risk assessments in the U.S. Constitution).
111
See Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 775 (“It would be patently unconstitutional for a
state to argue that the defendant is liable to be a future danger because of his
race); Goel et al., supra note 3 (suggesting that “Buck appears to be a case about
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sessments can also undermine the defendant’s due process
right to be sentenced based on accurate information.112 One
way to interpret that right concerns the level of technical accuracy in the tools’ design, which varies.113 Another concerns the
lack of transparency in the tools, particularly the proprietary
tools whose algorithms are often unavailable for inspection.114
RAI advocates tend to encourage courts to expand individual procedural rights to cope with these concerns at sentencing. For example, Professor Brandon Garrett and Dr. John
race, not about all immutable traits or risk more generally”); see generally Jessica
M. Eaglin, Predictive Analytics’ Punishment Mismatch, 14 I/S 87, 98–99 (2017)
(summarizing the emerging divide in scholarship on the predictive risk factors
versus sentencing factors issue).
112
In the capital context, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a right to
test the accuracy of information. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358
(1977) (emphasizing that “the sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must
satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause” and rejecting the state’s effort
to “permit[ ] a trial judge to impose the death sentence on the basis of confidential
information which is not disclosed to the defendant or his counsel”). In the
noncapital context, the Court has recognized a similar principle. See Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740–41 (1948) (“[O]n this record we conclude that, while
disadvantaged by lack of counsel, this prisoner was sentenced on the basis of
assumptions concerning his criminal record which were materially untrue. Such
a result, whether caused by carelessness or design, is inconsistent with due
process of law, and such a conviction cannot stand.”).
113
This issue turns on the question of how to measure accuracy, and whether
any of that matters in comparison to clinical, meaning unstructured, judgments
of risk made by human actors. I have toed into this discourse before, and will not
do so here. See Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 56, at 89–94. Suffice it to say,
the existing jurisprudence around predictions and criminal sentencing is extremely permissive. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (upholding the
Texas death penalty law that directs juries to determine whether to impose the
death penalty on a particular defendant in part based on predictions of a defendant’s future behavior); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 904 (1983) (upholding
the Texas statute by establishing a very low bar for constitutionality of predictions
generally). For a recent and accessible overview of the accuracy-related issues
raised by actuarial risk assessments, see MELISSA HAMILTON, RISK ASSESSMENT
TOOLS IN THE CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM—THEORY AND PRACTICE 24–58 (2020) (describing the science underlying algorithmic risk tools).
114
For example, equivant, the commercial developer of the Northpointe COMPAS assessment, refuses to release the formula used to predict recidivism risk in
the tool as a trade secret. See Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 761 (“Northpointe, Inc., the
developer of COMPAS, considers COMPAS a proprietary instrument and a trade
secret.”); Risk Scores: The Not-So-Secret Recipe, EQUIVANT (Aug. 14, 2020), https://
www.equivant.com/risk-scores-the-not-so-secret-recipe/ [https://perma.cc/
5ZW3-ZXBL], (noting that “raw score[s are] calculated based on the formulas in
the software”). For a critique of proprietary claims in criminal administration, see
Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1376 (2018) (warning of trade secret
concerns with RAIs at sentencing). For a recent claim that such proprietary tools
should violate an individual defendant’s due process rights at sentencing, see
Brenner et al., supra note 3, at 279–82 (2020) (discussing why “the Due Process
Clause and other policy justifications do require courts to give expanded opportunities for defendants to challenge the validity of a risk assessment” at sentencing).
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Monahan suggest “the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses demand additional assurances of consistency and reliability beyond the minimal requirement that some individual
decision-maker theoretically consider the relevant criteria and
state some reason for a decision [at sentencing].”115 As one
notable example, enthusiasm is growing for courts to recognize
some of the same procedural rights that have been urged in the
face of automated government decision making systems from
the civil, mostly welfare context. Professors Danielle Citron
and Frank Pasquale say courts should recognize enhanced due
process rights to “inspect, correct, or dispute” automated government decision making tools.116 Recently, data governance
policymakers have urged courts to adopt this meaning of the
right to be sentenced based on accurate information at sentencing.117 In a recent article on this point, several scholars
called for this kind of due process right at sentencing by analogizing between the right to inspect a presentence report and the
right to inspect an actuarial risk assessment.118 If one can
inspect a presentence report, they suggest, one should be able
to inspect the RAI score embedded within the presentence report to make sure it is accurate.119 Thus, these scholars and
advocates seek to expand procedural rights at sentencing by

115
Garrett & Monahan, supra note 70, at 484. Though the authors focus their
critique on the trend in the bail context, they discuss the expansion of actuarial
risk assessments in both the pretrial and postconviction context, and so appear to
apply the concern equally to both contexts.
116
See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 18–20 (2014) (encouraging
enhanced due process standards for individuals subject to adjudications with
automated predictions).
117
See Danielle Citron, (Un)fairness of Risk Scores in Criminal Sentencing,
FORBES (July 13, 2016, 3:26 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/
2016/07/13/unfairness-of-risk-scores-in-criminal-sentencing/#309a91754ad2
[https://perma.cc/278X-N72U] (commending the Loomis court for addressing
risk assessments, but critiquing its approach based on automation bias); see also
DANIELLE L. KEHL, PRISCILLA GUO & SAMUEL KESSLER, ALGORITHMS IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: ASSESSING THE USE OF RISK ASSESSMENTS AT SENTENCING 22–23
(2017), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33746041 [https://
perma.cc/9D7P-HTLD] (noting that “there is a plausible distinction between being
able to review and rebut the individual pieces of information that are fed into the
algorithm and being able to actual[ly] review how the score itself was calculated,”
but not necessarily urging a due process right to review).
118
Brenner et al., supra note 3, at 280–81.
119
See id. at 281 (“Because information considered by predictive algorithmic
tools is similar, if not identical, to that in federal sentencing reports, state and
federal courts should fashion procedural rules similar to the federal rules to allow
defendants to challenge the accuracy of algorithmic risk assessments.”); see also
id. at 282–83 (applying this argument to the Loomis decision).
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changing the meaning of an existing right to accommodate the
new realities of government decision making.
The courts, for the most part, have rejected these procedural challenges when defendants appeal from sentences where
courts considered an RAI in the sentencing process.120 For
example, in State v. Loomis, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered due process challenges to Eric Loomis’s sentence.121
The sentencing court considered risk scores included in the
presentence report provided to the court. The scores were the
product of a proprietary tool, the Correctional Offender Management Profile for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS), adopted
by the Wisconsin Department of Corrections for statewide
use.122 Mr. Loomis asserted that the tool produced inaccurate
information that he could not assess without information
about how the factors were weighed.123 The court, drawing on
the presentence report analogy, rejected the claim.124 It suggested that defendants receive information about the risk score
in advance of the sentencing hearing, and so no additional
information is required to satisfy constitutional due process
concerns.125
Juxtaposing this case against recent scholarly critiques
illuminates the value of the population-based sentencing
frame. If what courts are supposed to do at sentencing has
fundamentally mutated to the point where judges engage in
population-based sentencing, as unfortunately the trend has
been in the welfare context, then perhaps procedures should
change.126 Yet, if what judges still do at sentencing is pass
120
But see, e.g., State v. Guise, 919 N.W.2d 635, *4 (Iowa App. Ct. 2018)
(overturning a sentence because the sentencing judge relied on an actuarial risk
assessment that lacked transparency) (sentence reinstated in State v. Guise, 921
N.W.2d 26, 29 (Iowa 2018)).
121
Eric Loomis pled guilty to fleeing a police officer and operating a car without the owner’s consent. 881 N.W.2d 749, 754 (Wis. 2016). The trial court imposed the maximum sentence available under the statute. Id. at 756.
122
See ROGER K. WARREN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE JUDICIAL BRANCH
LEADERSHIP IN SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS REFORMS 1, 6 (2013), https://
www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/26217/state-judicial-branch-leadership-brief-csi.pdf [https://perma.cc/EMS4-Z883]. The Department of Corrections is responsible for preparing the presentence reports in Wisconsin. WIS.
STAT. § 972.15 (2020).
123
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d. at 757.
124
Id. at 761.
125
Id. (suggesting that the presentence report analogy is imperfect).
126
But see, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Digitizing the Carceral State, 132 HARV. L.
REV. 1695, 1722 (2019) (book review) (critiquing the trend in focus on technological fixes that aim to eliminate biases from algorithms and emphasizing that
“[s]ome government decisions simply should not be automated at all because
automation itself makes adjudication undemocratic.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-2\CRN202.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 27

POPULATION-BASED SENTENCING

16-FEB-21

10:52

379

moral judgment on individual defendants, then the procedures
do not need to change. The traditional sentencing process expects individual judges to make informed decisions about individual defendants at sentencing using all the information
available to them. Within the framework of population-based
sentencing, it becomes clear that we are asking the wrong
question of the courts. The matter is not whether judges can
consider a tool that lacks transparency or includes controversial, but not prohibited, predictive factors at sentencing.127
Rather, the matter is whether the conditions around sentencing have changed so much that courts must engage in population-based sentencing and procedural rights, once
unnecessary at sentencing, are now required.
While Congress, the U.S. Commission, and the federal appellate courts made it very clear that the sociological conditions
of sentencing had changed in the context of the federal guidelines, it is not so clear now in the context of actuarial risk
assessments at sentencing. What is clear from the state courts’
sentencing jurisprudence, however, is that this is the exact
question that the courts want to know. Two examples make
the point.
First, Virginia incorporates RAIs into the sentencing process through its advisory guidelines.128 These guidelines are,
and have always been, “flexible guideposts” to which judges
voluntarily adhere at sentencing.129 Judges can depart from
127
Brenner et al., supra note 3, at 279 (“The question is whether this ‘black
box’ methodology violates the due process rights of criminal defendants by denying them the opportunity to challenge their output risk scores, or the means by
which those scores were calculated.”). Whether judges can do this is distinct from
the normative question of whether they should. See Criminal Law—Sentencing
Guidelines—Wisconsin Supreme Court Requires Warning Before Use of Algorithmic
Risk Assessments in Sentencing—State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016),
130 HARV. L. REV. 1530, 1537 (2017) (“The Loomis opinion, then, failed to answer
why, given the risks, courts should still use such assessments.”).
128
There, the Virginia Sentencing Commission developed an actuarial risk
assessment to identify “25 percent of the lowest risk, incarceration-bound, drug
and property offenders for placement in alternative (non-prison) sanctions” in the
state. Richard P. Kern & Meredith Farrar-Owens, Sentencing Guidelines with
Integrated Offender Risk Assessment, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 165, 165 (2004). The
sentencing commission incorporated its Nonviolent Risk Assessment instrument
into the sentencing guidelines in 2002. Garrett & Monahan, supra note 70, at 461
(noting that the tool includes the following risk factors: age, gender, prior adult
felony convictions, prior adult incarcerations, prior juvenile adjudications, and
prior arrest in the last twelve months). Soon thereafter, it introduced two other
actuarial risk assessments for sex offenders into the state’s sentencing guidelines.
Kern & Farrar-Owens, supra note 128, at 166–67.
129
See Luttrell v. Commonwealth, 592 S.E.2d 752, 755 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Richard Kern, Sentence Reform in Virginia, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 84, 84 (1995)
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the guideline range for any reason at all. The actuarial risk
assessments can shape the recommendations within the
guidelines, but the guidelines themselves have never been enforceable through appellate review.130 A judge need not explain
why she did or did not adhere to the recommendations.131
Consistent with that structural reality, the Virginia state courts
virtually eliminated constitutional challenges to the use of actuarial risk assessments at sentencing through two appellate
cases decided in 2004. The first, Brooks v. Commonwealth,132
is an unpublished decision. There, defendant Christopher
Brooks raised due process and equal protection challenges to
the trial court’s consideration of the actuarial risk information
as part of the sentencing guidelines recommendation.133 The
appellate court dismissed these challenges on the basis that
the Virginia sentencing guidelines are nonbinding. So long as
the sentence falls within the statutory limits set by the legislature, appellate courts will not review it.134 A second case, Luttrell v. Commonwealth,135 results in a similar published
holding. There, the Virginia Court of Appeals considered defendant Brian Luttrell’s argument that the state’s Sex Offender
Risk Assessment Instrument was “unreliable in predicting recidivism.”136 The appellate court dismissed this challenge, explaining that failure to correctly apply the guidelines is
unreviewable on appeal.137 Thus, both Luttrell and Brooks
have precluded constitutional challenge to RAIs at sentencing
in Virginia courts.
More recent state cases echo this approach to procedural
challenges at sentencing. As an example, consider Michigan.
That state maintains advisory sentence guidelines based on the
offense and the offender’s criminal history.138 Though the
(noting that the guidelines were “voluntary,” meaning “judges could depart without specifying a rationale and there was no appellate review”).
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
No. 2540–02–3, 2004 WL 136090 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2004).
133
Id. at *1.
134
Id.
135
592 S.E.2d 752 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
136
Id. at 755. The heart of Mr. Luttrell’s challenge related to whether the court
could apply old or new guidelines since the sentencing commission increased the
threshold for increases in the guideline range.
137
Id.
138
See MICHIGAN JUDICIAL INSTITUTE, SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 5 (2020),
available at https://mjieducation.mi.gov/documents/sgm-files/94-sgm/file
[https://perma.cc/KVR5-RSUC] (even though the state sentencing guidelines are
now advisory rather than binding, “sentencing courts are still required to determine the applicable guideline range and take it into account when imposing a
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guidelines are no longer binding, sentencing courts must determine the applicable guideline range and take it into account
when imposing a sentence.139 Since 2014, Michigan Department of Corrections officials have incorporated the COMPAS
Risk/Needs Assessment into the presentence report provided
to state judges.140 In 2019, the Michigan Court of Appeals
issued an unpublished opinion concerning four consolidated
cases where the sentencing judges considered presentence reports that included the proprietary actuarial risk assessment
scores.141 The defendants asserted that lower courts violated
their due process rights by considering the COMPAS tool that
analyzes general population data, uses input factors that discriminatorily impact race and gender, and lacks transparency.142 In rejecting the challenges and affirming the
sentences, the court emphasized upfront: “A sentencing court
is not bound by the recommendations included in a
[presentence report], including the recommended range for a
minimum sentence under the sentencing guidelines.”143 Further, it rejected the defendants’ claim that “inclusion of COMPAS information unfairly influences or replaces a sentencing
court’s individual sentencing discretion” by analogizing between the tools’ recommendation and a probation officer’s
report.144
These holdings illustrate appellate courts looking to sentencing structure to understand if RAIs actually reduce the
court’s ability to pass moral judgment on individual defendants
at sentencing. Without indications of such, the courts are not
willing to overturn the trial court’s sentence determination.
They are not willing to expand procedural rights at sentencing
either. This illuminates a key point about population-based
sentencing. As with the guidelines, the presence of an actuarial risk assessment alone is not enough to convince the courts
sentence.”); People v. Lockridge, 870 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Mich. 2015) (rendering the
previously-mandatory state sentencing guidelines advisory by applying the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence).
139
MICHIGAN JUDICIAL INSTITUTE, supra note 138, at 5.
140
See Michigan Department of Corrections, Administration and Use of COMPAS in the Presentence Investigation Report 22 (2017), available at https://
www.michbar.org/file/news/releases/archives17/COMPAS-at-PSI-Manual-227-17-Combined.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LR4-NLFF].
141
People v. Younglove, No. 341901, 2019 WL 846117, at *1 (Mich. App. Feb.
21, 2019). Defendants challenged the sentences on the basis that COMPAS analyzes general population data, uses input factors that discriminatorily impact race
and gender, and lacks transparency. Id.
142
Id. at *2.
143
Younglove, 2019 WL 846117, at *3.
144
Id.
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that the nature of sentencing has fundamentally changed.
Courts care about that bigger picture. At sentencing, the sociological context around the nature of judging is critically important to determining whether and how procedural rights may
expand.
III
TECHNIQUE #2: CREATING PROCEDURAL RULES AT
SENTENCING
This Part argues that courts respond to the push toward
population-based sentencing by creating procedural rules that
preserve a judge’s ability to pass moral judgment on an individual defendant. The U.S. Supreme Court created light, and then
more substantive, procedural rules to preserve the ability for
federal judges to pass moral judgment on individual defendants under the federal sentencing guidelines. Some state
courts are creating light procedural rules to preserve judicial
power to pass moral judgment in the face of actuarial risk
assessments’ expansion at sentencing. Others would preserve
that power without creating new rules.
A.

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Jurisprudence

The U.S. Supreme Court created light procedural rules
and, as the guidelines were enforced more strictly against district court judges, heftier rules.145 These rules created a space
for judges to continue passing moral judgment on individual
defendants at sentencing.
For an example of a lighter procedural rule, consider Koon
v. United States.146 There, the Supreme Court established a
procedural rule that appellate courts review a sentencing
judge’s decision to depart from guideline recommended sentence ranges under a deferential, abuse of discretion stan145
The creation of procedural rules in constitutional criminal procedure resonates of a substantive due process analysis, but it is distinct. Substantive due
process analysis balances the liberty-enhancing potential of a right against the
government interest in an efficient sentencing process. See, e.g., Burns v. United
States, 501 U.S. 129, 148–56 (Souter, J., dissenting) (applying the Mathews v.
Eldridge test to due process right to notice concern under the mandatory guidelines). Courts tend to adopt a “balancing-of-interests” approach when creating
criminal procedure rules, which occurs “at a higher level” compared to the balancing conducted at the level of individual cases. Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E.
Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 737 (2000).
For a rich description of the “balancing-of-interests” approach to constitutional
criminal procedure, see id. at 794–98.
146
518 U.S. 81 (1996).
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dard.147 In reaching this holding, the court emphasized how
this population-based sentencing tool changed the nature of
sentencing. As Justice Paul Stevens explained for the Court,
“the Guidelines provide uniformity, predictability, and a degree
of detachment lacking in our earlier system [of sentencing].”148
At the same time, judging exists in some tension with those
aims. As the Court explained: “It has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to
consider every convicted person as an individual and every
case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes
mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to
ensue.”149 The procedural rule ameliorates that tension.150 In
other words, it affirmed the ability for judges to pass moral
judgment on individual defendants in the face of populationbased sentencing.
The more substantive procedural rule comes from Booker,
decided two years after Congress passed legislation to make the
federal guidelines “more mandatory.”151 Though a majority of
the Court held that the federal sentencing guidelines violated
an individual’s due process and jury trial right,152 the Court
went further by creating a procedural fix. The Booker remedial
decision identified two ways to cure the due process defect that
the sentencing guidelines created.153 One route, offered by the
remedial minority of the Court, was to apply the jury trial right
to the federal sentencing guidelines. That route, as explained
by Justice Stevens, would require a jury to find the facts that
trigger a sentence enhancement above the effective sentence
range proscribed by facts found beyond a reasonable doubt by
jurors at trial.154 For example, defendant Freddie Booker was
convicted of possession to distribute at least fifty grams of
crack cocaine, leading to conviction under a statute that carries a minimum sentence of ten years in prison and a maxi147
Id. at 91 (“The appellate court should not review the departure decision de
novo, but instead should ask whether the sentencing court abused its
discretion.”).
148
Id. at 113.
149
Id.
150
Id. (“We do not understand it to have been the congressional purpose to
withdraw all sentencing discretion from the United States district judge. Discretion is reserved within the Sentencing Guidelines, and reflected by the standard of
appellate review that we adopt.”).
151
See supra note 83.
152
See supra notes 100–01.
153
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 246 (summarizing the dual approaches to remedying the jury trial right problem in federal sentencing guidelines).
154
Id.at 273 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
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mum of life imprisonment.155 The jury, at trial, heard evidence
that the defendant possessed 92.5 grams of crack cocaine.156
Based on Booker’s criminal history and the amount of drugs
found by the jury, the sentencing guidelines prescribed the
judge to sentence Mr. Booker to a range between 210 and 262
months in prison.157 At the sentencing hearing, however, the
judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr.
Booker actually possessed 658.5 grams of crack cocaine; this
finding led to a guideline-prescribed sentence range between
360 months to life.158 The guideline-prescribed minimum,
while within the statutory range set out by the legislature, increased the defendant’s expected sentence range by more than
100 months.159 Justice Stevens’s solution to the jury trial right
problem would require the jury to make the finding of fact
about the amount of drugs possessed by the defendant beyond
a reasonable doubt.160 This approach would collapse the jury
trial right into a population-based sentencing regime.
The other route, adopted by the remedial majority of the
Court, created the space for judges to continue passing moral
judgment on individual defendants at sentencing. All of the
Justices agreed that an advisory sentencing guideline structure, where judges retained discretion to sentence as they saw
fit with reference to guidelines but independent from their diktats, could evade Sixth Amendment scrutiny. Justice Stevens
conceded as much in his defect majority opinion. He
explained:
If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as merely
advisory provisions that recommended, rather than required,
the selection of particular sentences in response to differing
sets of facts, their use would not implicate the Sixth Amendment. We have never doubted the authority of a judge to
exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a
statutory range. Indeed, everyone agrees that the constitutional issues presented by [this case] would have been
avoided entirely if Congress had omitted from the [federal
Sentencing Reform Act] the provisions that make the Guidelines binding on district judges . . . . For when a trial judge
155

Id. at 227.
Id.
157
Id.
158
The trial judge found that Mr. Booker possessed 566 grams of crack in
addition to the 92.5 grams found by the jury at trial. Id. at 235, 257.
159
Id. at 235.
160
Id. at 273 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); see also Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 286 (2007) (summarizing the options before the Supreme Court
when faced with the jury trial right problem in Booker).
156
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exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a
defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.161

In this regime, judges retained broad discretion free of technical guidelines.
The Booker remedial majority took the latter option.162 In
an opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, the U.S. Supreme Court created a new procedural rule at sentencing: the
guidelines were “effectively advisory.”163 It excised two statutory provisions that made the guidelines system mandatory in
nature. The first provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), prevented a
district court judge from departing from the mechanical dictates of the guidelines unless it made findings of an aggravating
or mitigating circumstance not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.164 The second provision,
section 3742(e), enhanced the appellate courts’ enforcement of
sentences outside the guidelines.165 Because the guidelines
recommended, but no longer required, a judge to sentence a
defendant above the effective statutory range set by guidelines
and based on the finding of particular facts, it evaded the constitutional concern.166
This decision created the space for individual judges to
continue the traditional process of passing moral judgment on
individual defendants at sentencing. The ensuing federal sentencing jurisprudence made this point abundantly clear. For
example, consider Kimbrough v United States.167 There, the
Court upheld a district court judge’s decision not to sentence a
defendant convicted of trafficking in crack cocaine within the
proscribed guideline range.168 Under the federal sentencing
guidelines, defendant Derrick Kimbrough should have received
a sentence between 19 to 22.5 years in prison.169 The district
court decided to “override” the guideline recommendation and
161

Booker, 543 U.S. at 233 (citations omitted).
This determination rested largely on the Court’s recognition that sentencing guidelines achieved the government’s interest in order—through the pursuit of
an efficient, uniform, and systemically managed sentencing structure. Id. at
250–58 (emphasizing the need for uniformity in sentencing, for managing
prosecutorial discretion, and for basing punishment on the “real conduct that
underlies the crime of conviction” (emphasis omitted)).
163
Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
164
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2018).
165
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e).
166
Booker, 543 U.S. at 233.
167
552 U.S. 85 (2007).
168
Id. at 112.
169
Id. at 92.
162
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sentence Mr. Kimbrough to the fifteen-year mandatory minimum penalty required in the case.170 The district court based
its decision in part on a policy disagreement with the U.S.
Sentencing Commission’s decision to incorporate the
mandatory minimum drug penalty structure into the otherwise
empirically-informed guidelines.171 In affirming the district
court’s sentence, the U.S. Supreme Court explained the sociological reasons why these drug guidelines are worthy of disagreement as a policy matter. It emphasized the racial
disparities that the drug guidelines are perceived to create,172
the contested origin of the mandatory minimum penalty,173
and the ongoing policy debate about the legitimacy of these
guidelines, specifically.174 These critiques of the guidelines
bolstered the court’s affirmation of the district court’s “institutional strength” in judging an individual defendant at
sentencing.175
As another example, the Court that same day affirmed a
sentence outside the proscribed guideline range for defendant
Brian Gall.176 Mr. Gall voluntarily exited a drug distribution
conspiracy ring three years before federal prosecutors charged
him with drug trafficking in methamphetamine.177 At sentencing, the Iowa district court refused to sentence Mr. Gall to time
in prison, contrary to the guideline recommendation.178 It suggested that a sentence to probation rather than prison would
do more to advance Mr. Gall’s “self-rehabilitat[ion].”179 In Gall
v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the district
court’s sentence, holding that it was not outside the realm of a
reasonable sentence even if it contradicted the guideline calcu170

Id. at 93.
Id.
172
See id. at 98 (highlighting the U.S. Sentencing commission’s conclusion
that “the crack/powder sentencing differential fosters disrespect for and lack of
confidence in the criminal justice system because of a widely-held perception that
it promotes unwarranted disparity based on race” and noting the racial disparities
in defendants convicted of federal crack cocaine offenses).
173
See id. at 94–97 (describing the distinction between crack and power cocaine, the crack/powder disparity in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, and the
Commission’s decision to collapse the weight-driven scheme into the guideline
structure).
174
See id. at 97–100 (describing the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s effort to
reform the crack/powder sentencing guidelines).
175
Id. at 109.
176
Mr. Gall was sentenced to 36 months of probation, compared to the sentence range of 30-37 months imprisonment prescribed by the federal sentencing
guidelines. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 43 (2007).
177
Gall, 552 U.S. at 41.
178
Id.
179
Id.
171
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lation.180 In Gall, like in Kimbrough, the court emphasized sociological realities about punishment in society. In both cases,
these critiques were launched to affirm Booker’s rule that the
federal sentencing guidelines are advisory.181
These cases affirmed the power of judges to pass moral
judgment on individual defendants in social context, rather
than sentencing in the abstract. The cases vindicated a particular kind of penal knowledge grounded in understanding the
individual and society. While legislatures and the federal sentencing commission pushed courts toward population-based
sentencing, the court defended lower courts’ ability to think
about “every convicted person as an individual and every case
as a unique study in human failing.”182 It achieved this
through creation of procedural rules.
B.

Actuarial Risk Assessments in the State Sentencing
Jurisprudence

In response to procedural challenges to sentences where
courts considered actuarial risk assessments at sentencing,
some state courts are creating light procedural rules to preserve the space for judges to continue passing moral judgment
on individual defendants at sentencing. Other states courts
would preserve that space without creating new procedural
rules.
For an example of a state court creating procedural rules to
preserve the space for judges to pass moral judgment on individual defendants rather than engage in population-based sentencing, consider State v. Loomis. Mr. Loomis challenged his
sentence on three grounds related to the sentencing court’s
reference to a proprietary RAI scores that characterized the
defendant as high risk.183 First, Mr. Loomis asserted that the
tool produced inaccurate information that he could not assess

180

Id. at 59–60.
Judges must still reference the federal sentencing guidelines as a starting
point in their sentencing process, even if a judge can issue a sentence that disagrees with the guideline range suggested by the Sentencing Commission on
policy grounds. E.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
182
Koon, 518 U.S. at 113; see also Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109 (emphasizing
the “institutional strengths” of the sentencing judge); Gall, 552 U.S. at 51–52
(emphasizing the “institutional advantage” of district courts at sentencing).
183
See Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 755 (noting that the COMPAS risk scores considered by the court at sentencing characterized Mr. Loomis as “high risk of
violence, high risk of recidivism, [and] high pre-trial risk”).
181

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-2\CRN202.txt

388

unknown

Seq: 36

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

16-FEB-21

10:52

[Vol. 106:353

without information about how the factors were weighed.184
Second, Loomis asserted that the tool violated his due process
right to an individualized sentence.185 Finally, Mr. Loomis argued that the court violated his due process rights by considering COMPAS-produced information because the tool relies on
gender as a factor to determine risk level.186
The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected each of these
claims,187 but created procedural rules in the state to preserve
the space for judges not to engage in population-based sentencing. Building upon a notable ruling on RAIs at sentencing
from Indiana in 2010,188 Loomis prohibits lower courts from
using an RAI to determine the severity of the sentence.189 It
adds another dimension through an additional constraint:
judges cannot use RAIs as “the determinative factor in deciding
whether an offender can be supervised safely and effectively in
the community.”190
The Wisconsin Supreme Court goes further by issuing several warnings to sentencing judges that must attach to every
presentence report that includes a COMPAS risk assessment in
the state.191 These warnings concern: (1) the tool’s proprietary
nature; (2) the tool’s reliance on group data versus individualized information; (3) the concern that tools disproportionately
classify minority defendants as higher risk; (4) the variation in
validation studies; and (5) the fact that COMPAS was developed
to assist the Department of Corrections in the post-sentencing
context.192 The warnings are a corollary to the procedural
rules declared by the court.193 In addition, the court called on
the judiciary to constantly monitor the tools, leaving space for
potentially different notifications attached to different types of
risk tools used now or developed in the future.194
These procedural rules aim to preserve the space for judges
to sentence individual defendants in social context rather than
184
Id. at 757. The Wisconsin Supreme Court previously stated outright that
defendants have a “constitutionally protected due process right to be sentenced
upon accurate information.” State v. Travis, 832 N.W.2d 491, 496 (Wis. 2013).
185
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 757.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 765.
188
Id. (citing Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 574 (Ind. 2010)).
189
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 768–69.
190
Id. at 768.
191
Id. at 769 (“[T]his written advisement should inform sentencing courts of
the following cautions as discussed throughout this opinion . . . .”).
192
Id.
193
Id. at 769–70.
194
Id. at 753, 770.
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engage in population-based sentencing. Though indirectly
stated, this sentiment is best expressed in two passages from
the Loomis decision. First, the majority opinion suggests that
judges, like correctional officers, may effectively “override the
computed risk as appropriate” in line with the COMPAS user
manual.195 Chief Justice Patience Roggensack more squarely
takes on the task of characterizing judicial sentencing power as
akin to passing moral judgment on an individual defendant.
She concurs in the majority opinion to emphasize that the
circuit court appropriately considered numerous sentencing
factors, as underscored by the majority opinion.196 She adds,
however, that courts should only “consider” COMPAS rather
than “rely” on RAIs at sentencing because this would contravene the defendant’s right to due process.197 In making a distinction between these two terms, the Chief Justice appears to
be emphasizing a notion of judging that is distinct from population-based sentencing. It requires something more like taking
multiple factors into consideration in social context, and less
like processing a person in the abstract based on predetermined factors and analysis.
In a more recent case, the Iowa court of appeals grappled
with whether to adopt the procedural rules declared in Wisconsin in its own state. In State v. Guise, Defendant Montez Guise
appealed from a sentence to incarceration because the sentencing court referenced an actuarial risk assessment without
the same warnings issued in Loomis.198 The appellate court
overturned the sentence as an abuse of discretion because the
actuarial risk assessment lacked transparency.199 While the
Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that Mr. Guise failed to
properly raise the appeal below,200 the dissenting opinions
from the appellate court illuminate how those appellate court
judges would adhere to the same approach as Loomis, without
creating new procedural rules.

195

Id. at 764.
Id. at 773 (Roggensack, C.J., concurring).
197
Id. at 774.
198
State v. Guise, 919 N.W.2d 635 (Iowa App. Ct. 2018).
199
Id. at *4 (“The [Iowa Revised Risk assessment] as described in Guise’s
[presentence] report was a black box, devoid of transparency. . . . We vacate the
sentence and remand for resentencing without consideration of the [risk assessment] on this state of the record.”).
200
State v. Guise, 921 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Iowa 2018).
196
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The dissents authored by Judge Christopher McDonald201
and Judge Michael Mullins make the point. In Judge McDonald’s dissent, he suggests that “[d]ue process does not restrict
district courts from considering risk assessment information.”202 This holding, he explains, would be in line with Loomis, which does not prohibit courts to consider the tools at
sentencing.203 Moreover, Iowa sentencing practice and procedure already makes it “impermissible for the district court to
use any single consideration as a determinative factor in sentencing.”204 Further, he rejects the claim considering the tools
would be an abuse of discretion in the state because it is relevant.205 Moreover, the tools themselves are not “sui generis
and wholly beyond the comprehension of sentencing
judges.”206 In a separate dissenting opinion, Judge Mullins
points to the heart of the matter when he reflects on the nature
of sentencing.207 As he explains, an actuarial risk assessment
is relevant and important in the state’s particular sentencing
structure.208 Yet, it is in the nature of judging to “weigh[ ] the
importance of relevant information and determin[e] what is
most important in guiding or justifying a particular decision.”209 Though he does not use the words, his decision suggests that the key to sentencing turns on considering various
factors related to each individual defendant.210
These cases illuminate two state courts grappling with the
trend toward population-based sentencing and whether it requires new procedural rules to preserve the space for judges to
pass moral judgment at sentencing. In Loomis, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court said yes. In Guise, the dissenting appellate
court judges said no. Yet, in both instances, the opinions
demonstrate judges questioning whether the nature of sentencing has changed such that the courts are no longer able to
pass judgment on individual defendants at sentencing. They
201
Judge McDonald has since been appointed to the state supreme court. I
refer to him by Judge rather than Justice to be consistent with his role at the time
the decision was issued.
202
Guise, 919 N.W.2d at *7 (McDonald, JJ, dissenting).
203
Id.
204
Id. at *11.
205
Id. at *12.
206
Id. at *9.
207
Id. at *21–*22 (Mullins, JJ, dissenting) (noting that integrated features of
Iowa’s sentencing structure between probation and incarceration).
208
Id. at *20–*21
209
Id. at *21.
210
See id. at *21 (“I have long held the view that the sentencing process can be
effectively understood as having three components: requirements, prohibitions,
and discretion.”).
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want to know whether a line has been crossed for judges in the
realm of population-based sentencing.
IV
MAKING SENSE OF THE TENSION
There is a deep tension between the courts’ techniques and
the academic and policy-driven trend toward population-based
sentencing. This Part explains the tension. It then identifies
the peril and obscured promise this tension presents.
The academic and policy-driven push to make sentencing
an abstract endeavor based on population-based representations of crime and offenders exists in cross-purpose with the
entire design of the sentencing process. While the sentencing
process is designed for individual judges to pass moral judgment upon individual defendants, population-based sentencing concerns the individuation of sentencing outcomes based
on abstract representations of crimes and offenders.211 While
the language of sentencing remains the same, the institutional
actors involved in sentencing remain the same, and the formalities of the process for judge and defendant remain largely the
same, the social and historical context of sentencing is
changed. To that end, academics and policymakers push to
make the courts accommodate this trend toward populationbased sentencing by changing their role at sentencing, too.
Rather than judge (or, for the moment, in addition to judging)
at sentencing, scholars increasingly encourage the courts to

211
See supra notes 42 and accompanying text. Note, on this point, that I have
not grounded my analysis on the right to be sentenced as an individual. I have
done this for three reasons. First, the courts have not engaged with the trend
toward population-based sentencing through the principle of individualized sentencing. See supra subpart II.A; subpart III.A. Second, “individualized sentencing” is itself a mutated concept such that the term does not really capture what
makes sentencing different now for judges. GARLAND, supra note 9, at 179–80
(explaining the trend toward punishment-at-a distance). Third, following Professors Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker, individualization, along with notions of
desert and fairness, reflect “different facets of the basic norm of equal treatment”
central to the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence. See Carol S. Steiker
& Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 369
(1995). These principles extend to capital and noncapital sentencing alike. See
Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1170 (2009).
This article does not engage with the equality-based critiques of actuarial risk
assessments. See supra notes 5, 20 & 75.

R

R
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manage: manage the tools,212 manage offenders,213 and manage each other.214
The courts have not embraced regulating population-based
sentencing tools. On this point, the federal guidelines are particularly instructive because, given their complexity and implementation, those guidelines represent the most explicit effort to
push judges toward population-based sentencing. Thus,
Booker is most illuminating to this point. There, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded procedural rights and simultaneously,
effectively, took them away.215 Rather than create a world
where individual defendants have more rights and the courts
stop sentencing, it created a world where individual defendants
have the same rights and judges can keep sentencing under
population-based sentencing tools.216 In essence, what the
U.S. Supreme Court did—and what it appears the state courts
are trying to do—is to prevent population-based sentencing,
even by just a hair. So, as policymakers push states further
toward population-based sentencing, individual defendants
may get more procedural rights. But eventually, the courts will
create procedural rules to preserve the space for judges to con212
See, e.g., Slobogin, Principles, supra note 4 (proposing an evidentiary
framework of fit, validity, and fairness around risk assessments at sentencing);
see also State v. Guise, 921 N.W.2d 26, 34 (Iowa 2018) (suggesting changes to
sentencing procedure that would allow the courts to manage the parties to regulate actuarial risk assessments).
213
See, e.g., Garrett & Monahan, supra note 70, at 441–47 (encouraging the
expansion of supervisory alternatives to prison sentences for judges to use with
risk assessments at sentencing). In prior work, I have noted that the expansion of
treatment programs for low-risk offenders, which appears non-controversial from
a managerial framework, threatens to widen the net of people trapped in the
carceral state, and can, unintentionally, sustain the prison population in the long
run. See, e.g., Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189,
223–25 (2013) (warning that the managerial logic behind predictive risk assessments and cost-efficiency driven sentencing reforms will not reduce mass incarceration). This article emphasizes that the whole nature of sentencing – not just
what we do with defendants, but what judges are good for – shifts around the
expansion of population-based sentencing tools, too.
214
See, e.g., Garrett & Monahan, supra note 70, at 479, 492 (suggesting that
sentencing guidelines should be more binding when they incorporate risk assessments and emphasizing the need for “increased scrutiny” where judges ignore risk
assessments); Kevin R. Reitz, The Compelling Case for Low-Violence-Risk Preclusion in American Prison Policy, 38 BEHAV. SCI. L. 207, 207 (2020) (urging appellate
enforcement of sentence outcomes on the basis of risk assessments) [hereinafter
Reitz, Compelling Case for Low-Violence-Risk Preclusion].
215
See supra subpart III.A (describing the Booker rule that federal sentencing
guidelines are advisory).
216
On this point, it is worth emphasizing that states did not have to follow the
path set forth in Booker. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 286 (2007)
(summarizing the options before the states when faced with the jury trial right
problem in Booker).

R

R
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tinue sentencing individual defendants in the face of population-level tools.
In short, the sentencing process is not likely to change
much, at least not any time soon. The courts are going to
preserve the judge’s choice to pass moral judgment on individual defendants even though this is increasingly what policymakers do not want them to do. And if they cannot do that, the
courts will expand procedure in sentencing to make it increasingly burdensome to engage in outright population-based sentencing.217 What they won’t do—or at least have not done yet—
is manage population-based tools through the sentencing process. Yet this is exactly what advocates of the trend toward
population-based sentencing want the courts to do.
A.

The Tension as Perilous

This tension is troubling on several accounts, none of them
new to sentencing. Actuarial risk assessments do shape judicial sentence determinations,218 just like sentencing guidelines
have before them.219 By refusing to engage with the tools, the
217
See id. (suggesting that states can either expand the jury trial right at
sentencing or make their sentencing guideline structures nonmandatory to avoid
the fact-finding concern explored in Blakely and Booker).
218
See, e.g., Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/S7X39P9M] (providing anecdotal evidence of COMPAS risk assessment’s impact on
judge’s sentence determination in Zilly case); Megan T. Stevenson & Jennifer L.
Doleac, Algorithmic Risk Assessment in the Hands of Humans 36–37 (Nov. 18,
2019) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3489440 [https://perma.cc/V8L2-CQ6C] (finding that,
based on empirical research in Virginia, “judges’ decisions are influenced by the
risk score” even though the tool is advisory in nature).
219
For example, even after the Supreme Court jurisprudence rendered the
federal sentencing guidelines advisory, judges continue to adhere to the tools at
sentencing to varying degrees. See, e.g., Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing
Disparity after Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2010) (despite finding
an uptick in variances from the guidelines, concluding that many judges still
adhere to the federal sentencing guidelines even after they were rendered advisory
and suggesting that, among other explanations, this may be because some judges
“actually agree with the Guidelines’ sentencing recommendations more often than
their colleagues” or due to “institutional reasons, such as deference to the Commission or a belief that the Guidelines carry democratic legitimacy”); Crystal S.
Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines
Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268 (2014) (finding an uptick in
interjudge disparities after Booker and attributing at least some of that disparity
to mandatory minimums); but see U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, Interactive Data Analyzer,
https://www.ussc.gov/research/interactive-data-analyzer [https://perma.cc/
5UKG-A73A] (demonstrating that courts exercise the power to vary upward or
downward from the guidelines after Booker about 20% of the time, while much
more disparity in sentencing generates from government-sponsored motions).
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courts legitimate their use whether judges can choose to sentence on different bases or not. If the courts do not regulate the
tools, perhaps the tools will shape a judge’s thinking in the
normatively “wrong” way. Further, actuarial risk assessments,
like sentencing guidelines, often lack meaningful judicial oversight in their design.220 Perhaps, by refusing to engage with
the tools through the sentencing process, judges will be influenced by a normatively “wrong” kind of population-based representation. Finally, the sentencing process, like much of
criminal procedure, exists at cross-purpose with the underlying rationales behind these population-based sentencing tools,
which orient around prevention rather than culpability.221 If
the courts do not engage with the tools, perhaps they will undermine criminal administration in more problematic ways.222
These concerns are compelling. I leave it to others to continue
exploring those possibilities in the literature in light of the continuities between actuarial risk assessments and earlier efforts
to formalize judicial decision making around population-level
representations of crimes and offenders.
Situating these tensions in the frame of population-based
sentencing, however, expands the frame of critique. It creates
a foundation to question not just the logistics of actuarial risk
assessments at sentencing, but also the trend toward population-based sentencing as a persistent, political choice. To that
end, perhaps the most perilous critique arising from the courts’
approach to population-based sentencing tools concerns the
220
This concern is obvious in the context of many popular RAIs, whose proprietary nature obscures their design features. See, e.g., Nishi, supra note 67, at
188–90 (urging judicial oversight in the design of actuarial risk assessments used
at sentencing). Yet even publicly developed sentencing guidelines lack judicial
oversight in their design. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 40 (emphasizing that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 lacked a “provision for citizens or
other affected persons to obtain judicial review of the final rules issued by the
sentencing commission” analogous to the Administrative Procedure Act).
221
Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness Cloaking Preventive Detention
as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (2001) (warning that reforms
like mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines are driven by a logic of
prevention at odds with criminal justice); Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO.
L.J. 57, (2018) (noting the “significant fissure between principles restricting how
risk is measured at sentencing and how risk is measured in actuarial sentencing”). See also Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive
State, NOTRE DAME L. REV. 317–24 (2015) (explaining the theoretical tension between a “culpability conception of punishment” and “predictive restraints” based
on prevention).
222
See Goel et al., supra note 3, at 15–16 (raising the blameworthiness question around actuarial risk assessments at sentencing). Cf. Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85
GEO. L.J. 775, 808-09 (1997) (suggesting that preserving blaming as a social
practice should be protected).
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phenomenon of mass incarceration, which RAI advocates frequently invoke. Despite modest reductions in recent years, the
United States remains the lead incarcerator in the world.223
RAI advocates suggest that this population-based sentencing
tool is necessary to reduce incarceration safely, or at least it
could help along the way.224 Perhaps, the argument might go,
by preserving space for judges to keep sentencing on bases that
are not population-driven, the courts contradict that socially
beneficent end.225 That policy argument raises a question
about what mass incarceration is, actually. If the problem of
mass incarceration is simply a quantitative matter of too much
incarceration, perhaps the courts’ response is problematic.226
If, as I believe, the problem of mass incarceration reflects
deeper, structural issues in society, there is promise in the
tension between the courts’ jurisprudence and RAI advocates
aims, discussed below.
B.

The Tension as Promising

The courts’ resistance to managing population-based sentencing tools presents an interest convergence between the
courts and the small, but fierce contingent of scholars and
policymakers who oppose the expansion of actuarial risk assessments at sentencing, and in criminal administration more
broadly, for reasons to do with the structural realities of criminal law enforcement in the era of mass incarceration.
223

WENDY SAWYER & PETER WAGNER, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, MASS INCARCERATHE WHOLE PIE 2020 (2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/
pie2020.html; E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2019 1
(2020) (noting that the U.S. prison population has modestly declined since 2009).
224
In identifying low risk defendants suitable for diversion from prison
sentences, RAIs at sentencing may “conserve scarce prison resources for the most
dangerous offenders, reduce the overall costs of the corrections system, and avoid
the human costs of unneeded confinement to offenders, offenders’ families, and
communities.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 6B.09 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final
Draft 2017). Advocates further suggest that the introduction of more consistent,
transparent, and automated predictions of recidivism compared to clinical assessments may reduce the threat of individual bias in judicial decision making.
See id. Advocates tend to frame RAIs as an important component to reducing
mass incarceration while maintaining public safety because the tools can identify
those low-risk persons best suited for diversion from prison sentences. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 6B.09 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017).
225
C.f. MEGAN STEVENSON & JENNIFER DOLEAC, AM. CONS. SOC’Y, ROADBLOCK TO
REFORM 7 (2018) (suggesting that judges who do not follow RAIs recommendations
at sentencing are frustrating the tools’ potential to reduce incarceration in
Virginia).
226
See Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117
MICH. L. REV. 259, 268–71 (2018) (distinguishing between “over” and “mass” criminal justice reforms).
TION :
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Every day, judges sentence individual defendants across
this country. The state courts’ emerging jurisprudence rightfully recognizes that sentencing has not been, and should not
be, based solely on technical—nor subjective—assessments of
recidivism risk. At best, actuarial risk assessments provide a
piece of information that may inform pursuit of the utilitarian
aims of punishment, in particular incapacitation.227 Adopting
RAIs into the sentencing process does not eliminate the other
theories of punishment.228 More importantly, however, the assessments do not account for the socially constructed dimensions of crime or punishment.229 Judges can take account of
these realities at sentencing, and they should be encouraged to
do so. The sentencing process is designed for them to do so.230
The courts’ jurisprudence around population-based sentencing reflects a normative judgment about the nature of sentencing. If the U.S. Supreme Court had collapsed the jury trial
227
RAIs are controversial in part because they only fit with utilitarian aims of
punishment. See supra note 64. As I have explained elsewhere, current RAIs do
not accord with punishment theory, even incapacitation. See Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 56, at 99–100. For recent scholarship that explores the thin line
between using RAIs to further rehabilitation and incapacitation at sentencing, see
Collins, supra note 221, at 87–89. For a critique of how the discourse between the
diverging theories of punishment can encourage overpunishment, see Carol S.
Steiker, Criminalization and the Criminal Process: Prudential Mercy as a Limit on
Penal Sanctions in an Era of Mass Incarceration, in THE BOUNDARIES OF CRIMINAL
LAW 27, 49 (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2010) (“[B]oth retributivism and social welfare
theory, as discourses deployed in the current world, will tend toward overpunishment, even when policy makers and discretionary institutional actors self-consciously and in all good faith see themselves as trying to promote their
appropriate ends.”).
228
See Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1, 16–23 (2010) (describing the dominant theories of punishment and noting
the ascendance of utilitarian theories).
229
Even a transparent, well-designed actuarial risk assessment cannot fully
grapple with the realities of punishment in society because structural forces
shape crime enforcement and so permeate the entire tool design process, from the
selection of data to the selection of risk factors to the creation of risk categories.
See generally Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 56. That RAIs eschew focus on
social and governmental forces at sentencing is part of their problematic appeal.
See Eaglin, supra note 8, at 534–36 (framing the tools as neorehabilitative and
explaining how “the language of technical accuracy [around RAIs at sentencing]
disaggregates crime from social and governmental forces and instead focuses on
individual character and responsibility”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
230
As Professor David Garland explains, criminal justice decisions were underpinned by a social style of reasoning for much of the twentieth century. GARLAND, supra note 9, at 188. This would include the sentencing process that
emerged in this time period. See supra subpart I.A. An “economic” style of reasoning has emerged with the rise of population-based sentencing tools, which
presents “crime as an externality of normal social interactions or which conceive
crime as the outcome of reasoned, opportunistic choices.” GARLAND, supra note 9,
at 189.
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right into the guideline driven sentencing process, it would
have tolerated more population-based sentencing, too. The
Court rejected that approach.231 State courts’ emerging RAIinformed sentencing jurisprudence adopts a similar position.
While individual defendants are not succeeding in their appeals, state courts are using procedural challenges to further a
vision of sentencing as a unique point in the criminal process
where judges can pass moral judgment on individual defendants.232 In so doing, they create the space for judges to “resist[ ] the allure of (depersonalized) personalization” and, by
default, assert the “sociality” of sentencing.233 From a perspective that considers standardization neither value-neutral nor
inherently beneficial at sentencing, the emerging jurisprudence
is worthy of further consideration. The courts’ response to
population-based sentencing tools “promotes a particular vision of society” and punishment distribution.234 That vision is
deeply humanist.
At the same time, scholars and policymakers persistently
object to the expansion of RAIs in criminal administration for
structural reasons. RAIs produce racial disparities because
they rely on historical data generated in a deeply racially and
economically stratified society defined by an expanding
carceral state.235 Common predictive risk factors like gender,
age, socioeconomic status, and criminal history are far from
objective in this sociohistorical context because mass incarceration disproportionately affects marginalized communities,
particularly African Americans with less than a high school
degree from urban centers.236 From this perspective, the indi231

See supra notes 149–64.
C.f. Roberts, supra note 126, at 1722 (suggesting that the shortcoming in
due process approaches to automated government decision making systems lies
in the reality that “some government decisions should not be automated at all
because automation itself makes adjudication undemocratic”).
233
RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY: ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR THE NEW JIM
CODE 17 (2019).
234
Meares & Harcourt, supra 145, at 745.
235
See Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk
Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 240 (2015) (analyzing the role of criminal
history in actuarial risk assessments and concluding that “relying on prediction
instruments to reduce mass incarceration will surely aggravate what is already an
unacceptable racial disproportionality in our prisons”) [hereinafter, Harcourt,
Proxy]; c.f. Devon W. Carbado, Blue on Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some
of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1485 (2016) (describing a variety of social
forces that make African-Americans vulnerable to ongoing police surveillance and
contact).
236
Eaglin, Technologically Distorted, supra note 8, at 527 (explaining that the
factors used to predict recidivism risk “reflect the realities of social neglect and
susceptibility to police surveillance”). For a recent investigation of the impact
232
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vidualizing emphasis on prediction, automation, and historical
data collected in the era of mass incarceration as the method to
reform sentencing is itself a problem.237 Encouraging the use
of predictive tools that reflect problematic features of the
carceral state threatens to further entrench mass incarceration
as a particular mode of governance that operates to manage
and control marginalized populations through the carceral
state rather than offer support and resources outside it.238
Moreover, it threatens to obscure through reform at the margins the deeper problem that this phenomenon reflects—the
structural exclusion of marginalized people from society.239
For opponents of RAIs in the era of mass incarceration, expanding individual procedural rights cannot fix the structural
problems that the tools expose at sentencing.240
For the courts, actuarial risk assessments are problematic
to the extent that advocates may use this population-based
sentencing tool to frustrate their ability to pass moral judgment
upon individual defendants in social context. Though such
conditions have not come to pass yet, there is very good reason
to think that they will be used to that end, and soon. For
example, scholarship and public policy debates are starting to
query how to make courts adhere to RAIs’ results more freRAIs may have on Latinx people as well, see generally Melissa Hamilton, The
Biased Algorithm: Evidence of Disparate Impact on Hispanics, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1553 (2019) (noting the dearth of scholarship exploring RAIs’ impact on Hispanic
populations and demonstrating the issue through a study of pretrial bail algorithms). For a seminal study demonstrating the concentrated effect of mass incarceration on marginalized black communities, see BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT
& INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 30 (2006).
237
Eaglin, Technologically Distorted, supra note 8, at 535 (critiquing the individualist rhetoric of accuracy as a frame to engage with the expansion of RAIs at
sentencing).
238
Roberts, Digitizing the Carceral State, supra note 126 (arguing that RAIs
“reflect and implement a carceral approach to social problems” endemic to the
larger transformation of the carceral state upon which mass incarceration
emerges).
239
Eaglin, Technologically Distorted, supra note 8, at 536 (“To concede on the
basis of politics to the expansion of risk tools threatens to mask the very difficult
problems of historical change that create the foundation for their very expansion”). Cf. BENJAMIN, supra note 233, at 5–6 (warning that “the employment of new
technologies that reflect and reproduce existing inequities but that are promoted
and perceived as more objective or more progressive than the discriminatory
systems of a previous era” are dangerous in part because “once something or
someone is coded, this can be hard to change”).
240
Roberts, supra note 238, at 1721–24 (illuminating the potential and limits
of due process critiques of big data, and urging a more radical approach to the
trend toward digitizing the carceral state); c.f. Paul Butler, Poor People Lose:
Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2198 (2013) (warning that
the expansion of criminal procedural rights are particularly problematic when
critiquing the intersection of race, poverty and the carceral state).
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quently. In a recent article, Professor Brandon Garrett and Dr.
John Monahan suggest giving RAIs a “presumptive” effect at
sentencing, so that more offenders’ sentences will turn on their
risk scores.241 Professor Kevin Reitz urges something similar,
querying how to get appellate courts to enforce sentencing
rules based on actuarial risk scores.242 Policymakers, too, are
exploring ways to make sentence outcomes accord with
RAIs.243 In unison or independently, these developments may
change the courts’ perspective on actuarial risk assessments at
sentencing.
Thus, between RAI opponents and the courts, an unlikely
interest convergence is developing.244 The courts have an interest in preserving the sentencing process, including the traditional space for judges to pass moral judgment on individual
defendants. To do that, they will need to resist the pressure to
manage actuarial risk assessments through the sentencing
process. A way to do that is to resist the trend toward popula241
Garrett & Monahan, supra note 70, at 479–80 (querying whether to make
RAIs “presumptive” in effect at sentencing).
242
Reitz, Compelling Case for Low-Violence-Risk Preclusion, supra note 214, at
207–08 (suggesting that RAIs should be an important component to “presumptive
decision rules that prohibit the imposition or continuation of prison terms for . . .
carve-out groups” and urging appellate enforcement of such rules).
243
MEGAN STEVENSON & JENNIFER DOLEAC, AM. CONS. SOC’Y, ROADBLOCK TO REFORM 8-9 (2018) (reflecting on relationship between judges, actuarial risk assessments, and decareral efforts); Evidence-Based Sentencing, CTR. FOR SENT’G
INITIATIVES, https://www.nscs.org/csi/evidence-based-sentencing [https://
perma.cc/B8GB-RDSV] (last visited Oct. 24, 2020) (encouraging RAI-informed
sentencing for probation-eligible offenders). Policymakers condition funding to
state agencies based on adoption of actuarial risk assessments, though this practice has not been implemented in the context of state courts yet. See, e.g., OHIO
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, POLICY STATEMENT ON THE OHIO RISK ASSESSMENT SYSTEM AND
RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT TOOLS 2–3, (2015), http://ohiojudges.org/Document.ashx?DocGuid=9e4c2814-6ffa-4018-9156-88fea13bf95e [https://
perma.cc/MZF2-Q54S] (warning that “reliance or non-reliance on risk assessment tools should not be used to determine grant funding to courts” in response
to passage of House Bill 86 in 2011); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.1111(d)
(West 2020) (conditioning funding to correctional facilities on the basis of RAI
scores in offenders).
244
See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (“[T]his principle of interest-convergence provides: The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.”). Aya Gruber
characterizes this principle in the context of sentencing reform as “the phenomenon of racial justice remedies succeeding when they reflect the agenda of empowered lawmakers and constituencies.” Aya Gruber, Equal Protection Under the
Carceral State, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1337, 1341 (2018). To the extent that these
tools are offered as a solution to reduce the threat of racial bias, actuarial risk
assessments resonate of this critique. However, this Article uses the term to
illuminate a convergence of interests that may, quite unexpectedly, inure to the
benefit of marginalized defendants.
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tion-based sentencing. The existing jurisprudence on population-based sentencing demonstrates courts are inclined to
adopt that route.
That endeavor—of sentencing individual defendants in social context rather than engaging in population-based sentencing—is, in reality, a critique of the cultural and political
assumptions that shape this historical present. Actuarial risk
assessments reflect the advance of a particular kind of abstract
penal knowledge that only makes sense in a particular social
context. The institutionalization of actuarial risk assessments
at sentencing, even for the well-intentioned purpose of reducing incarceration in the states, not only extends the trend toward population-based sentencing, but it also expands what
Professor David Garland describes as the “culture of control.”
As Garland explains, “the risky, insecure character of today’s
social and economic relations is the social surface that gives
rise to our newly emphatic, overreaching concern with control
[in criminal administration] and to the urgency with which we
segregate, fortify, and exclude [through the carceral state].”245
The impulse to control sentence outcomes through technical,
abstract representations is deeply connected to this social reality, which encompasses the high rate of incarceration in this
country, but really expands beyond it. The tools only make
sense if we are “increasingly less tolerant and . . . increasingly
less capable of trust” in judges and the kind of contextualized
penal knowledge they can produce.246 More recent critiques of
actuarial risk assessments in particular expand upon this insight by suggesting that population-based sentencing tools
also make sense in a society committed to “acting without understanding.”247 This, too, is an extension of Professor Garland’s culture of control, in the sense that the tools make sense
in a society that is increasingly willing to create “new structures of controls and exclusions directed against those groups
most adversely affected by the dynamics of economic and social
change.”248 Challenging the assumptions that shape this present, including those that create practices that disproportion245

GARLAND, supra note 9, at 194.
Id. at 195.
247
AAS, supra note 7, at 86 (suggesting that actuarial risk assessment “are not
instruments for understanding, but instruments . . . that make it possible to act
without needing to understand.”); VIRGINIA EUBANK, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW
HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 176–78 (2017) (critiquing
the turn toward technologies in the welfare space as propelling the “cognitive
dissonance required to both see and not see reality”).
248
Id.
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ately, and adversely affect the most marginalized among us, is
exactly what RAI opponents set out to do.249 Because the
courts and RAIs’ opponents are most sensitive to these two
trends, we might expect that at some point, their interests converge. This Article invites scholars to see the emerging sentencing jurisprudence around actuarial risk assessments in
just such a light.
That being said, if the courts are committed to preserving
the sentencing process and the space for judges to pass moral
judgment on individual defendants at sentencing, they will
need to vindicate a qualitatively different kind of sentencing
process grounded in active rather than passive judicial thinking. For sentencing judges, it means explaining sentences on
the record. This kind of explanation does not mean simply
stating that the court took other factors into consideration
other than actuarial risk scores to avoid appeal. Rather, it
means bucking the trend toward population-based sentencing
and explaining how the commission of this crime by this defendant in this social context led to this particular sentence. The
point is not for courts to “override” an actuarial risk score with
their own prediction of future behavior,250 but rather to engage
with and ground a sentence in the rich sociological realities
that illuminate a judge’s institutional expertise at sentencing.
To that end, resistance also means exercising what Professor
Carol Steiker has described as “prudential mercy.”251 Rather
than grounding a notion of moral judgment in the competing
theories of punishment, prudential mercy invites judges to
pass judgment from a position of doubt and discomfort that
punishment in the carceral state is appropriate in the era of
mass incarceration.252 While conventional wisdom suggests
249
See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 238, at 1725 (“[I]mproving risk assessment
procedures within multiple interlocking systems designed to exclude black people
from social, economic, and political participation threatens to obscure these procedures’ antidemocratic functions and make them operate more efficiently. The
only way to address the digitized carceral state is to dismantle its social institutions that enforce a racial caste system and reconstitute them in radically new
ways.”); BENJAMIN, supra note 233, at 11 (urging that we “pull[ ] back the curtain”
on purportedly neutral technologies to “draw attention to forms of coded inequity”
in the tools and in society).
250
In fact, I would encourage judges to avoid the word entirely. What a judge
does at sentencing is far more sociologically situated than anything a tool can
recreate.
251
See Steiker, supra note 227, at 49–54 (describing the contours of a theory
of prudential mercy).
252
Id. at 50 (urging discretionary actors, including sentencing judges, to adopt
“an openness to doubt whether even our best, good-faith attempts to translate
punishment theory into practice will lead us astray [in the era of mass incarcera-
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that such doubt should be highest where risk is low, a deconstructed and sociologically-rich account of the structural factors that produce recidivism risk invites judges to believe that
such doubt may be highest where an individual defendant’s
risk score is high.253
Consider, as example, the sentencing of Eric Loomis. Mr.
Loomis, age 32, pled guilty to attempting to flee a traffic officer
and operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent as
repeat offenses.254 The court sentenced Mr. Loomis to six
years of incarceration in prison with reference to the COMPAS
tool that characterized him as high risk of violence, high risk of
recidivism, and high pretrial risk during his sentencing colloquy.255 We know that the court considered this offense as
“extremely serious” and that it believed that Mr. Loomis drove
the car while someone else shot a gun out the window.256 But
the court did not explain why Mr. Loomis engaged in this behavior, and whether that should make him more or less culpable in this instance.257 We know that Mr. Loomis had a
criminal history, including serving probation for delivering prescription drugs in 2012. But there is no reference to the structural lack of access to drug treatment outside the carceral state
pervasive in Wisconsin due to state and local refusal to invest
in such programming, including the southwestern part of the
state from which Mr. Loomis hails.258 Such information contextualizes Mr. Loomis’s characterization as high risk. For example, the lack of access to such resources may relate to his
criminal history, his history of drug addiction, and his sporadic

tion], and a willingness therefore to moderate or even forgo otherwise authorized
punishment, at least in cases where our doubts are strongest.”).
253
For a recent, philosophically grounded argument that points to the same
conclusion, see Christopher Lewis, Mass Incarceration, Risk, and the Principles of
Punishment (unpublished manuscript) (draft on file with author).
254
See supra note 119; see also Anne Jungen, Man Gets 8.5 Years in Drive-By
Shooting Case, LACROSSE TRIBUNE (Aug. 13, 2013), https://lacrossetribune.com/
news/local/driver-gets-8-years-in-drive-by-shooting-drug-case/article_b0fbb83e-03d3-11e3-8b4b-001a4bcf887a.html [https://perma.cc/8NCRX575].
255
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 756 & n.18; see also supra note 183.
256
Mr. Loomis contested this point. See Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent in State
v. Loomis, 2016 WL 485419 at *3–4 (Jan. 19, 2016).
257
Instead, the court emphasized the need to protect the public, including
that Loomis was high risk. See id. at *4.
258
Parker Schorr, Across Wisconsin, Meth Use Balloons in the Shadow of the
Opioid Crisis, WISCONTEXT (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.wiscontext.org/acrosswisconsin-meth-use-balloons-shadow-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/CL2Q6PDY].
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job history, too.259 These socially contextualized facts may offer insight to how Mr. Loomis ended up driving the car on the
night in question. All of these sociological realities are captured in actuarial risk assessments currently used at sentencing, whether proprietary and publicly developed in origin.260
When disaggregated from one another, these predictive risk
factors paint a very different picture of this defendant. By actively deconstructing the tools and analyzing their significance
in creating the conditions under which Mr. Loomis conducted
this crime, a judge might think more deeply about this defendant in this case at sentencing. Perhaps this analysis would
suggest that Mr. Loomis’s case is one where the judge should
doubt whether this extensive term of incarceration for this
crime of conviction is the appropriate sentence. Such an analysis also may not, in this case or others, lead to that conclusion.261 Either way, it would substantiate the qualitatively
different kind of sentencing process within which the lack of
procedural rights makes some sense.
To that end, appellate courts have an important role to play
in this kind of resistance, too. If the appellate courts are not
going to manage population-based sentencing tools or expand
procedural rights in the sentencing process, they, too, have to
foster the qualitatively different kind of sentencing process
where lack of procedural rights makes some sense. Appellate
courts can do this in a number of ways. The courts should
actively create a socially contextualized frame pertinent to the
individual offender when analyzing the individual sentence.
Rather than framing their opinions around the technicalities of
the tools, the court could foreground the deeper analysis that
sentencing judges do, or should do, at the start of their appellate decisions when reviewing a sentence where a judge considered an actuarial risk assessment. These courts may also raise
the voice of actuarial risk assessments’ opponents in the juris259
See id. (describing the experience of a Wisconsin woman who lost her job
and spent time in jail waiting for access to a drug treatment program).
260
See supra note 55 and accompanying text (listing common actuarial risk
assessment predictive factors).
261
Even if unequally distributed, contextualized mercy is better than no
mercy at all. See Steiker, supra note 227, at 55–56. To the extent that advocates
already suggest that low-risk defendants should be diverted from incarceration,
see supra notes 219–20, this approach would not contravene that impulse.
Rather, it expands it while creating the foundation for the production of different
social meaning from such efforts. Jessica M. Eaglin, The Categorical Imperative
as a Decarceral Agenda, 104 MINN. L. REV. 101, 119–20 (2020) (critiquing the
shortcomings of the efficiency frame in advancing decarceral sentencing reforms,
including RAIs).
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prudence. Recent cases have done an excellent job in referencing the ongoing debates about the tools, including concern that
they produce racial disparities.262 Yet courts will need to go
further, by situating those debates within the review of a
judge’s sentence for a particular defendant. They could also
ground their review of the sentence by referencing structural
realities evident in a particular case and pertinent to the ongoing debates.
This avenue for resistance is second-best, and likely unsatisfactory to many readers. This account generates from the
social reality that population-based sentencing tools cannot
escape the deep, structural inequities in society from which
they emerge.263 There are other ways to engage with the design
of actuarial risk assessments used at sentencing. In earlier
work, I have urged expansive transparency, accountability,
and interpretability measures in the development and adoption
of RAIs at sentencing that can address at least some of the
procedural concerns that defendants raise in the courts at this
moment.264 Central to that contribution is the notion that so262
See, e.g., Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 256, 268, 270 (citing to various legal
articles regarding the design of actuarial risk assessments); Guise, 921 N.W.2d at
31 n.1–2 (citing to various articles on actuarial risk assessments in criminal
administration); Guise, 919 N.W.2d (same).
263
Perhaps this means the problem lies in the courts’ unwillingness to engage
with the equal-protection-based critiques launched at the tools. See Goel et al.,
supra note 3 (critiquing the Loomis court for avoiding the equal protection claim
about actuarial risk assessments’ design); Huq, supra note 5, at 1055 (suggesting
that actuarial risk assessments may be used if they are designed to counteract
racial stratification); Starr, supra note 20 (“To be sure, the state has an important
(even compelling) interest in reducing crime without unduly increasing incarceration. But contrary to other commentators, I do not think this interest can justify
the use of demographic and socioeconomic variables in [RAI-based sentencing]. A
careful review of the empirical evidence and methods underlying the instruments
show that their use does not substantially advance the state’s penological interests and that less discriminatory alternatives would likely perform at least as
well.”). I have my doubts on this point. See, e.g., Ben Green, The False Promise of
Risk Assessments: Epistemic Reform and the Limits of Fairness, F.A.T. (Jan.
27–31, 2020) (critiquing debates about actuarial risk assessment design and
fairness in the context of pretrial bail assessments, and calling for epistemic shifts
in the way we interpret the issue of algorithmic fairness). Much more can be said
on this topic, but it will have to wait for future work.
264
See Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 56, at 110–21. For example, I argue
there that “state and local government bodies could create statutes or ordinances
that require specific disclosures if the tools are used for the administration of
justice.” Id. at 113. Professor Aziz Huq makes a similar point when he urges the
expansion of ex ante regulation to address constitutional and public policy concerns raised by machine learning tools. Aziz Z. Huq, Constitutional Rights in the
Machine-Learning State, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1875, 1945 (2020) (suggesting ex
ante adoption of tools that use “‘simple rules’ that perform (almost) as well as
complex instruments yet are far more readily comprehensible.”). This, in turn,
would allow judges to deconstruct the tools when sentencing. My point, again, is
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ciety cannot adopt a passive role in response to the expansion
of actuarial risk assessments as a key site in producing social
knowledge used to distribute resources through criminal administration. I argue there that law must play an important
role in facilitating deep contestation and engagement in this
kind of knowledge production by grounding the design and
adoption of the tools in normative, social values rather than
technical ones.265
This contribution builds from that observation, with a particular focus on the courts. The nature of sentencing is changing, and courts must adjust. Fundamentally, this
transformation relates to the format of knowledge. Though
population-based tools make sentencing appear more formal
and more abstract, judges are uniquely positioned to create a
counterbalance when passing judgment on individuals at sentencing. They will need to produce narratives grounded in local
knowledge that critique the systemic level representations of
crime and offender. They will need to embrace thinking about
the structural context in which an individual appears before
court rather than resigning to population-based representations as the only kind of knowledge that matters at sentencing.266 This kind of thinking is hard, but necessary.267 In the
era of mass incarceration, sentencing constitutes an act that
leads to the distribution of punishment; but it is also a key
space where law engages in its sense-making function within
society.268 From the narratives that a judge constructs in sentencing colloquies to the written opinions produced by the
higher courts, law shapes society’s “common sense” understandings of the world. Through this kind of knowledge pronot to encourage judges to adjust their own prediction of risk by discounting
certain factors included in a tool. Rather, I encourage judges to seek understanding, via the identification of factors used to predict risk, of the social conditions
that may contribute to this defendant’s appearance before the court.
265
Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 56, at 63–64, 107–07.
266
See Eaglin, Technologically Distorted, supra note 8, at 501–02 (critiquing
the technical orientation of debates about actuarial risk tools’ advance as lopsided
and urging a turn to social transformation that sustain the advance of the tools
and legitimate the expansion of the carceral state).
267
See Cecelia Klingele, The Promise and Peril of Evidence-Based Corrections,
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 580 (2016) (“If those in the criminal justice system do
not consciously articulate the values that animate their use of state power, then
the tools they use take on a life of their own, imposing bureaucratic values, such
as efficiency and risk aversion, in place of the moral principles that have long
justified the exercise of penal power.”).
268
Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 109 (1984) (law
exerts power “less in the force that it can bring to bear against violators of its rules
than in its capacity to persuade people that the world described in its images and
categories is the only attainable world in which a sane person wants to live.”).
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duction, the courts can actively contest the passive response to
the expansion of technologies in the carceral state and the
resignation to a status quo embedded within them.269 The
population-based sentencing frame demonstrates that the
courts can achieve this end not through intensive, procedural
regulations of sentencing technologies, but through the production of other narratives grounded in social rather than technical concerns.270
To be sure, the courts’ approach to population-based sentencing technologies does not guarantee that judges will adopt
this active role. At best, the jurisprudence creates the space for
such analysis. Yet, perhaps the space to embrace a different
kind of penal knowledge at sentencing grounded in both “compassionate concern for the offender, rather than some more
instrumental end” and sincere doubt about the expansion of
the carceral state is a place to begin to think differently in this
historical moment.271 Perhaps, by thinking about the tools as
part of the larger trend toward population-based sentencing,
judges will see the possibilities that lie in actively thinking
about sentencing from a position of sincere doubt. Perhaps, as
the courts start engaging with actuarial risk tools from a position oriented around their institutional expertise to sentence in
social context, they can raise awareness to the larger, structural problems that need to be addressed in society. Scholars
and courts should further ponder these possibilities.
On a deeper level, however, this Article places the jurisprudence around actuarial risk assessments in conversation with
the jurisprudence that emerged around earlier populationbased sentencing tools to compel scholars to think more critically about how and why we as society are choosing to employ
technologies at sentencing in this historically contextualized
moment. Individualizing, population-based technologies are
expanding in criminal administration as “solutions” to issues
that build from and reflect deep, structural problems at the
intersection of criminal administration and society.272 The ex269
Eaglin, Technologically Distorted, supra note 8, at 486–87 (connecting the
advance of actuarial risk assessments with transformations in social notions
critical to sustaining the expansion of the carceral state).
270
In this sense, this approach could embody a “demosprudence of poverty”
that utilizes procedural due process challenges to “recognize substantive and
structural matters of poverty while staying within the ostensible confines of current doctrine.” Monica Bell, Stephanie Garlock & Alexander Nabavi-Noori, Toward a Demosprudence of Poverty, 69 DUKE L.J. 1473, 1477 (2020).
271
Steiker, supra note 227, at 50.
272
BENJAMIN, supra note 233, at 17.
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pansion of such tools is not inevitable, and worthy of critical
reflection in each space in which they appear. In the postconviction sentencing context, the tools raise deep tensions
that build from a long history of transformation to the nature of
sentencing. By preserving the sentencing process and the
space for judges to actively pass judgment on individual defendants in social context, courts remind us that this present
does not have to be our present. There are other ways to respond to mass incarceration, and other ways to guide judicial
sentencing discretion. Judges surely need and appreciate guidance to help inform their awesome responsibility at sentencing. But why not provide guidance that plays to their
strengths, like descriptive accounts of important sentence considerations,273 rather than implement population-based tools
that are more and more technical, more and more abstract,
and less and less within the institutional expertise of sentencing judges?274 Why not address mass incarceration by investing in marginalized communities most affected by the
phenomenon outside the carceral state, rather than investing
in individualizing technologies to target them within it?275 Why
not reduce long prison sentences through finite caps on sentence length, rather than seeking to enhance social control over
individual judges?276 These questions are both cultural and
political. If they appear beyond critique, it is because we make
assumptions about what is possible in this historically-shaped
present. Quite unexpectedly, when viewed in the frame of population-based sentencing, the jurisprudence on actuarial risk
assessments can sustain those deeper questions. Engaging
with those questions, in turn, creates the space to think differently about this present and, possibly, imagine different, more
inclusive futures. This Article invites others to consider those
possibilities in light of this jurisprudence going forward.

273
See, e.g., Alschuler, Failure of Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 42, at
941–45.
274
See, e.g., Garrett & Monahan, supra note 70, at 446, 488–89 (urging judicial training on RAIs).
275
See Eaglin, Technologically Distorted, supra note 8, at 541 (urging reflection on the relationship between actuarial risk assessments’ expansion and deteriorating social conditions for marginalized communities).
276
See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 233 (2017) (suggesting a cap on prison sentences for all offenses and decriminalizing low-level
offenses).
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CONCLUSION
This Article situates the trend toward institutionalizing actuarial risk assessments in state sentencing processes as the
extension of a larger trend toward population-based sentencing. It connects the emerging sentencing jurisprudence around
actuarial risk assessments at sentencing with the jurisprudence that developed around the federal sentencing guidelines
in the 2000s. By analyzing these seemingly disparate sets of
case law in tandem, this Article illuminates how courts resist
the trend toward population-based sentencing. They expand
procedural rights at sentencing and create procedural rules
that preserve the space for judges to continue passing moral
judgment on individual defendants. This response exists in
tension with the academic and policy-driven trend toward population-based sentencing. Though this tension hardly offers a
fix to the problematic implications of these tools’ advance, it
creates the space to think differently about this current moment. This Article invites scholars and courts to do so going
forward.

